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NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant Taylor National, Inc., which was the plaintiff
below, brought an action in the District Court for Utah County
to recover a real estate sales commission from DefendantRespondent Jensen Brothers Construction Co.

Jensen Brothers

filed a counterclaim seeking to have the alleged real estate
listing agreement declared void or, in the alternative, to
recover damages from Taylor National for its breach.

In a

third-party complaint, Jensen Brothers sought to recover the
amount of the commission from the purchaser of the real estate,
Leon Harward.

Harward, in return, sought rescission or re-

formation of the contract of sale of the property and damages
from Taylor National and Jensen Brothers resulting from fraud
in the sale of the real estate, from breach of the implied
warranty of habitability, and for breach of the contract of
sale.

Harward, who was third-party-plaintiff and defendant

below is also an appellant here.

The district court, Judge

J. Robert Bullock, sitting without a jury, granted recovery to
Taylor National through Jensen Brothers aqainst Harward.

The

court found no cause of action by Harward against Jensen
Brothers or Taylor National, and granted Jensen Brothers leave
to notice a trustee's sale of the property.

Appellant Harward

seeks from this Court an order reversing the verdict of the
District Court, or in the alternative, an order granting a
new trial.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Appellant Harward is the purchaser of property ref erred
to hereafter as the Barrington House.

Taylor National, Inc.

is a real estate broker, alleging to hold a valid real estate
listing agreement on the Barrinqton House, executed by the
builder-vendor, Jensen Brothers Construction Co.

The questions

presented by the appeal are the following:
1.

Is the real estate broker, Taylor National, Inc.,

entitled to a real estate sales commission resulting from the
sale of the Barrington House?
2.

If Taylor National, Inc. is entitled to a commission,

is the purchaser of the Barrington House, Leon Harward, liable
for payment of this commission either directly to Taylor
National, Inc. or to Taylor National through any other party?
3.

Does the evidence establish

the fact that Harward

has proven a cause of action against Jensen Brothers Construction Co. for damages resulting from breach of the implied
warranty of habitability in the construction of the Barrington
House?
4.

Does the evidence establish that Harward has proven

a cause of action against Jensen Brothers Construction Co.
for damages resulting from fraud in failing to disclose that
the subdivision

improvemen~

in which the Barrington House is

located had not been accepted by the City of Orem, and were
substandard?
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5.

Is Jensen Brothers Construction Co. equitably

estopped to deny that it agreed to take land from Harward in
exchange for its equity in the Barrington House?
6.

Did the trial court err in failing to reform the

contract between Harward and Jensen Brothers Construction Co.
to reflect their agreement to trade land for Jensen Brothers'
equity in the Barrington House?

STATUTES INVOLVED

The following statute is involved in this proceeding:
Utah Code Annotated, § 25-5-4:
In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writinq subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
{_5)
Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In the first months of 1977, Paul Taylor, then President
of Taylor National, Inc.,

(Taylor National), contacted repre-

sentatives of Jensen Brothers Construction Co.

(Jensen Bros.)

to arrange for the construction of a home to be displayed in
the Utah County Parade of Hornes.

(Record at 11-13.)

The

agreement ultimately reached by the parties provided that
Jensen Bros. would own the property and build the home, while
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Taylor National would be the selling broker.
14.)

(Record at 13-

Taylor National's share of the profits upon the sale

of the property would be provided for in a six percent real
estate broker's commission.

(Record at 13.)

Jensen Bros.

executed a real estate listing agreement on a form provided
and prepared by Taylor National.
18.)

(Exhibit 9, Record at 17-

The Barrington House was listed at a selling price of

$140,000.00

(Exhibit 9, Exhibit 19.)

Because the listing

agreement is not dated, it is impossible to determine when
that listing agreement was executed.

However, Marvin Jensen,

who signed the writing on behalf of Jensen Brothers, kept the
carbon copy of the agreement.

(Exhibit 19.)

His copy differs

markedly from the writing relied upon by Taylor National.
(Exhibit 9, Exhibit 19, Record at 18-20.)

The writing was not

signed by representatives of Taylor National until after it
had filed this suit.

(Record at 20-21.)

During the home show, in August 1977, the home, known as
the Barrington House, was manned by sales people from Taylor
National.

(Record at 22, 28-29.)

During the period of the

home show, Taylor National received no offers to purchase the
Barrington House.

(Record at 79.)

However, after the show,

it was presented with offers which were rejected by the seller.
(Record at 30-32.)
Early in September 1977, Leon Jensen of Jensen Bros.
received a call from Harward in which he expressed an interest
in buying the home.

(Record at 98, 259.)

Leon Jensen told
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Harward that he would instruct Taylor National to contact
him.

(Record at 98-99.)

He then phoned Paul Taylor of Tay-

lor National, gave Taylor Harward's telephone number, and
asked him to contact Harward.

(Record at 32,99.)

Taylor

attempted to call Harward once, but without success.
then left town for a ten-day trip to Hawaii.
33.)

He

(Record at 32,

Because Leon Jensen was concerned when representatives

of Taylor National had not contacted Harward, he called them
approximately a week after his first call.

(Record at 99.)

At this time he again asked someone from Taylor National to
contact Harward.

(Record at 99.)

After nothing came of the

first two phone calls, Leon Jensen again called Taylor National, but was told that Paul Taylor was in Hawaii.

He asked to

speak to Bryce Taylor, who was the sales manager, but was
told that he was not in.

He left his name with Taylor Nation-

al, but was not contacted again.

(Record at 100.)

While

Paul Taylor was in Hawaii, no representative of Taylor
National made any attempt to contact Harward.

(Record at 90.)

Due to his frustrations in failing to get Taylor
National to contact Harward, and only after it was obvious
to him that Taylor National would not help with the sale,
Leon Jensen got together with Harward to arrange a sale.
(Record at 102.)

At this point, approximately three to four

weeks had passed since Harward had first contacted Jensen.
Upon Paul Taylor's return from Hawaii, Leon Jensen informed
him that he had arranged a sale to Harward.

(Record at 33, 34.)
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Paul Taylor informed Jensen at that time that unless Harward,
who was a real estate agent, contacted Taylor National for
an arrangement on the commission, it would charge Jensen
Bros. one hundred per cent of the commission.

(Record at 34.)

Representatives of Taylor National did not take part in the
closing, and took the position that it was Harward's duty to
contact them concerning the sale of the house and a split on
the commission.

(Record at 49-51, 59, 89, 91-93.)

Jensen Bros. accepted a written offer for purchase from
Leon Harward and his wife, Judith, on October 19, 1977.
The closing took place on December 9, 1977.

At that time,

Jensen Bros. accepted net proceeds of $131,600.00.
36.)

(Exhibit

This selling price was $8,400.00 lower than the asking

price, a difference represented by the six per cent broker's
commission.
From the beginning of negotiations, it was proposed by
Harward, and agreed to by Jensen Bros., that Jensen Bros.
would accept a trade of equity in land for their equity in
the Barrington House.

This is evident from Harward's first

proposed Earnest Money offer (Exhibit 60) , Letters from
Jensen Bros. to the mortgage company prior to the closing,
(Exhibit 37), and the American Horne Mortgage, Inc. Disclosure/
Settlement Statement (Exhibit 36).

Furthermore, representa-

tives of Jensen Bros. travelled with Harward on numerous
occasions to view various parcels of land both in Utah County
and Salt Lake County.

(Record at 265, 72, 297, 304, 388-89.)
-7-
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Harward continued to show land to representatives of Jensen
Bros. from October 1977 until the spring of 1979.
at 269-72, 388-89.)

(Record

Jensen Bros. even entered into an Earnest

Money Agreement on one of these parcels procured by Harward,
(the Williamson 25 acres) , and a letter from Marvin Jensen to
Leon Harward dated December 1, 1978 indicates that land
would be acceptable in trade for equity in the Barrington
House.

(Exhibit 55.)

At the December 9, 1977 closing, no

written transaction had been consummated to effect a trade of
equities, so Harward executed and delivered a trust deed note
to Jensen Bros. in the amount of $45,600.00 with an accompanying trust deed.

(Exhibit 59.)

Jensen Bros. later reneged

on its agreement to trade equities and caused Security Title
and Abstract Co., the trustee under the trust deed, to serve
a "Notice of Default" on Harward around July 13, 1978.
(Exhibit 63 .. )
When Harward first moved into the Barrington House, the
subdivision in which it is located had not been approved or
accepted by the Orem City Council.

(Record at 226-27.)

Because the gutters, sidewalks, and roads were not properly
installed, they deteriorated sreatly, making it difficult
to drive in and out of the subdivision at times.
at 254.)

(Record

In addition to problems with the subdivision, the

Barrington House began to settle after Harward moved into
it.

This caused large cracks to appear in the walls and the

garage floor, the fireplace began to pull away from the wall,
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and doors did not properly fit their frames.
231-235, Exhibits

44A~44K.)

(Record at

None of these problems were

disclosed to Harward before he moved into the Barrington
House.

(Record at 421.)

As a result, the value of the Bar-

rington House was greatly depressed, and it became impossible
to resell the house.
This action was instituted around June 7, 1978 by Taylor
National to recover its alleged commission on the sale of
the Barrington House from Jensen Bros.

Jensen Bros. coun-

terclaimed against Taylor National and filed a third-party
claim against Harward on approximately July 20, 1978.

Taylor National's Position at the Trial
Taylor National took the position that it held a valid
real estate listing agreement, signed by the party to be
charged thereunder, and in writing.

Taylor National claimed

that it had proven its right to a real estate sales commission
of $8,400.00 plus interest and attorney's fees.

Jensen Brothers' Position at the Trial
Jensen Bros. contended that Taylor National was not entitled to a commission because it failed to prove a valid
contract of agency.

The contract alleged by Taylor National

was not signed by both parties according to its terms and
it omitted material matters, such as the duration of the
agreement.

Furthermore, Taylor National had failed to use
-9-
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reasonable efforts to procure a purchaser and had breached
the contract by placing the property under the multiple
listing service.
Jensen Bros. took the position that Harward acted as
a real estate agent when he purchased the Barrington House.
As a result, Jensen Bros. paid him a commission rather than
discounting the price of the house by the amount of the
broker's commission.

Jensen Bros. claimed that this suit

was a fight between two realtors over a commission.

Jensen

Bros., having paid one commission, should not be held to pay
another to Taylor National.
Jensen Bros. contended that the evidence showed that it
never agreed to accept land in exchange for its equity in
the Barrington House.

Consequently, the remedy of reforma-

tion of the contract of sale was not available to Harward because there had been no agreement of such nature on which the
court could base a reformation.
Finally, Jensen Bros. alleged that there was no evidence
either of fraud or that the Barrington House was uninhabitable.
If there was a duty on the part of Jensen Bros. at all, that
duty was to build the home in a reasonably workmanlike manner.
However, if there was no negligence on the part of the builder,
Jensen Bros. alleged, then there was no duty to pay damages
to the buyer.

The only remedy available upon breach of the

duty was rescission of the contract.
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Harward's Position at the Trial
Harward contended that Taylor National was not entitled
to a commission because it had failed to prove a valid contract of agency on which it could base a commission.

Taylor

National had further failed to meet its fiduciary duties to
the seller and had abandoned its listing agreement.
Harward contended that, as purchaser of the Barrington
House, he was not acting as a real estate salesman, but as an
individual purchasing property for his own use.

For this

reason, he was not liable for the broker's commission.

Never-

theless, Harward tendered forty percent of the broker's commission to Taylor National, but it was rejected.
Harward contended that the evidence showed that Jensen
Bros. had agreed to take land in exchange for its equity in
the house from the very beginning of negotiations.

Jensen

Bros. was equitably estopped by its acts, statements, and other
conduct to deny this.

Harward contended that these facts

were the basis for reforming the contract in accordance with
the original agreement.
Finally, Harward contended that the evidence demonstrated
substantial and material defects in the Barrington House.
claimed damages resulting from the breach of the implied
warranty of habitability and alleged that Jensen Bros. had
committed fraud by failing to disclose the condition of the
subdivision.

Consequently, the value and marketability of
-11-
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He

his home was greatly diminished, all to his injury.

The Trial Court's Decision in this Case
The trial court found as follows:
1.

Taylor National was entitled to $8,400 plus six

percent interest, or the amount of its broker's commision.
But judgment was limited in equity when the court prohibited
execution of judgment against Jensen Bros. and specified
that the judgment did not constitute a lien on the real property owned by Jensen Bros.

Instead, Taylor National was

required to pursue the judgment in behalf of Jensen Bros.
against Harward, Harrison, & Soule, dba Value Realty & Continental Value Realty.

Proceeds from any recovery were to

be applied toward Taylor National's judgment against Jensen
Broso
2.

Jensen Bros. was awarded judgment in the amount of

$8,400 plus six percent interest and attorney's fees against
Harward, Harrison and Soule.
3.

No cause of action was shown in Jensen Bros.'

counterclaim against Taylor National.
4.

No cause of action was found in Harward's counterclaim,

crossclairn, and third-party complaint against Jensen Bros.,
Taylor National, and Paul Taylor.
5.

The Court found that the trust deed and trust deed

note of October 28, 1977 evidencing indebtedness of $45,600.00,
plus interest, were valid instruments enforceable by their
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terms against Harward.

The Court found the trust deed note

in default and notice of default having been recorded on
July 14, 1978, more than three months having elapsed since
that time.

The preliminary injunction previously issued

against Jensen Bros. was terminated and removed, and Jensen
Brose was free to instruct the trustee to notice a trustee's
sale of the premises.
6.

Jensen Bros. was granted leave to file a supplemental

complaint against Harward for any amounts owed on the bond
after the trustee's sale, upon application to the court and
notice to Merrill Harward.
7.

Jensen Bros. was given leave to seek a deficiency

judgment against Harward upon supplemental complaint after
damages were determined upon the trustee's sale of the premises.

ARGUMENT

I

THIS IS A CASE IN EQUITY,
IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS A DUTY
TO REVIEW THE FACTS,
AS WELL AS THE LAW.
Utah law provides that an appeal from the decision of a
district court in an equitable action may be upon questions
of both law and fact.
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From all final judgments of the district courts,
there shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court.
The appeal shall be upon the record made in the court
below and under such regulations as may be provided
by law.
In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and fact: ... UTAH CONST. Art. VIII,§ 9.
Like the Utah Constitution, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provide for appellate review of both the law and facts in
equitable actions.

"In equity cases the appeal may be on

questions of both law and fact."

UTAH R. CIV.

p.

7 2.

The language of the Constitution has been interpreted
to impose a duty upon the Supreme Court to review both the
facts and the law in equity cases.

Crockett v. Nish,

147 P.2d 853, 854 (Utah 1944), Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d
1359 (Utah 1974).

As the Court said in Mitchell,

Under Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah,
it is both the duty and prerogative of this court in
an equitable action to review the law and facts and
make its own findings and substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court. Mitchell v~ Mitchell,
supra at 1360.
In the present action, appellant Harward seeks reformation of a contract for the sale of land.

This is an equitable

§§

action.

66 AM. JUR. 2d, Reformation of Instruments,

1, 2

(1979).

Therefore, in accordance with Utah law, this Court

has a duty to review both the law and facts in this case.
Furthermore, the Court has a duty to overturn the findings of
the trial court if they are found to be against the weight
of the evidence.
98 P.2d 695

Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 99 utah 139,

(1940), McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996,997

(Utah 1978), Olivero v. Eleganti, 214 P. 313, 315 (Utah 1923),
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d
940' 943

(1962).

II
IN THIS SUIT FOR A BROKER'S COMMISSION,
TAYLOR NATIONAL IS NOT ENTITLED
TO RECOVER AGAINST THE BUYER, LEON HARWARD
Before he may recover in an action for a real estate
sales commission, a broker must prove that he acted pursuant
to an express contract of agency.

Case v. Ralph, 56 Utah

243, 188 P. 640 (1920), Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292
P. 915 (Utah 1930), Olson v. Neale, 116 Ariz. 522, 570 P.2d
209 (Ariz. App. 1977).

The broker's right to a commission is

measured by the terms of his contract.

Watson v. Odell, 58

Utah 276, 198 P. 772 {1921), Eastern Okla. Land & Cattle Co.

v. Dorris, 549 P.2d 78 {Okla. 1976), Throm v. Reid, 534 P.2d
330 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975), Firkins

v. Affolter, 504 P.2d 365

(Colo. Ct. App. 1972), Watson v. United Farm Agency, Inc.,
439 P.2d 738

(Colo. 1968), Ridgway v. Chase, 265 P.2d 603

(Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1954), Scott v. Huntzinger, 365 P.2d
692

(Colo. 1961), Gleichenhaus v. Pratt, 190 Kan. 1, 372 P.2d

273

(1962), Blank v. Borden, 115 Cal. Rptr. 31, 524 P.2d 127

(1974), Dale v. Raines, 252 P.2d 22

(Dist~

1953), Ridgway v. Chase, 265 P.2d 603

Ct. App. Calif.

(Dist. Ct. App. Calif.

1954), Uhlrnann v. North Whittier Highlands, Inc., 334 P.2d
1022 (1957), Ford v. Palisades Corp. 225 P.2d 545 (Dist. ct.
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App. Calif. 1951), Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Horne, 145 P.2d 189
(Okla. 1944), Denbo v. Weston Inv. Co., 245 P.2d 650 (Calif.
Dist. Ct. App. 1952).

Furthermore, the Utah Statute of

Frauds requires that contract to be in writing.

Smith Realty

Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915, Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640.
In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:

*

(5)

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4.
As the Court said in Blank v. Borden,
(A)ny right to compensation asserted by a real estate
broker must be found within the four corners of his
employment contract, ... In short it is the contract
which governs the agent's compensation, and that contract
is strictly enforced according to its lawful terms.
Blank v. Borden, 524 P.2d at 129-30.
Because he must rest his right to a commission on his
contract of employment, a broker must look to his employer
for compensation and cannot recover a commission from those
who did not directly employ him.

12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers

§§ 163-4, 12 C.J.S. Brokers§ 82, 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency§ 247,

C. Buck Bush Realty Co. v. Whetstone, 266 So.2d 135
1972).

(Miss~

A broker can recover only in accordance with the terms

of his employment.

Ford v. Palisades Corp., 225 P.2d 545

(Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1951).

This means that the seller,

and not the buyer, is solely liable for the broker's commission.
Moss v. Sperry, 191 So. 531 (Fla. 1939), Steinberg v. Buchman,
167 P.2d 207

(Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1946), McDaniel v. McCauley
-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

371 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1962) ,·Keyes Co.'v. I·sland Fbx Motel, Inc.
260 So.2d 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), Webster v. Hochberg,
105 Ill. App .. 2d 466, 245 N .E. 2d 529 (1969) .
Ordinarily, and in the absence of some understanding
or agreement to the contrary, the vendor alone is
liable for the payment of the commission due a broker
employed by him to sell the property, or to find a
purchaser ready, able, and willing to purchase, and the
purchaser's only liability is to pay to the owner the
agreed purchase price. Moss v. Sperry, 191 So. at 537.
Therefore, before he can recover in an action for a real
estate sales commission, the broker must show that there is
a contractual relation between himself and the person aqainst
whom he seeks to recover the commission.

Chambers v. Shivers,

497 P.2d 327 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972), Johns·v. Ambrose-Williams
&

Co., 136 Colo. 390, 317 P..2d 897 (1957).
In the present case Taylor National bases its right to

recover in this action on a writing purporting to be a real
estate listing agreement, and introduced at the trial as
Exhibit 9.

(Record at 17, lines 27-30 to 18, lines 1-5.)

Nowhere in that writing, however, is there evidence of a contractual relationship between Taylor National and Leon Harward,
the buyer.

If a contract exists at all, it is between Taylor

National and Jensen Brothers.

Harward was not a party to

the writina on which Taylor National bases its right to a
commission, and Taylor National may not recover a real estate
sales commission from him, which the AMended Judqment of
April 15, 1980 purports to allow.
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Taylor National has neither alleged nor proven a contract
granting it the right to recover against Harward for the sale
of the Barrington House -- Harward was the purchaser of the
house, and was not Taylor National's employer.

Taylor

National's right to a recovery rests against Jensen Brothers,
if it rests against anyone.
While Harward is a real estate broker by profession, he
purchased the Barrington House for use as his own personal
residence.

He was acting as a buyer, not a broker, when he

contacted Jensen Bros., and he represented no party other
than himself.
other.

In other words, he was a buyer just like any

Because Harward was a broker, and could handle the

closing of the sale on his own, Jensen Bros. was willing to
reduce the price of sale on the home by the amount of the
commission it normally would have paid had it been represented
by a broker.

And, as the owner of the house, Jensen Bros.

was free to sell the home for any price it saw fit.
There are no known cases denying a broker the rights
enjoyed by other buyers in general solely on the basis of
his eMployment as a real estate broker.

Rather, the cases

indicate that a broker purchasing property for himself does
not act as broker.

In Blocklinger V.'Schlegel, 58 Ill. App.

3d 324, 374 N.E. 2d 491 (1978), a real estate broker who had
purchased property for hirnself brought suit for specific
performance of the real estate sales contract.

The court

found that there was no fiduciary duty between the broker-18Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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purchaser and the sellers, nor was there contractual privity
resulting from a multiple listing agreement which the sellers
had entered into with their real tor which required the real tor
to

relist the property with other members of the county board

of realtors listing service.

The court observed:

In Fish v. Teninga, (1928) 330 Ill. 160, 161 N.E. 515,
it was quite properly stated that the business of being
a realtor is not one containing an element of public
interest so as to require him to deal as a fiduciary
with everyone.
Before a fiduciary duty arises it must
be proven that a realtor has been employed by someone
and that he is therefore an agent for them.
Blocklinger
v. Schlegel, 374 N.E. 2d at 493.
In Case v. Business Centers, Inc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 267,
357 N.E. 2d 47

(.1976), the sellers sued a broker-buyer for

breach of fiduciary duty.

In denying recovery against the

buyer, the court held that a

broker~buyer

which purchased pro-

perty for its own use through the seller•s broker was under
no duty to disclose to the sellers that it had obtained a
portion of the sales commission under an agreement with the
listing broker.

In other words, the broker-buyer owed no

fiduciary duty to the seller when the seller did not employ
him.

The broker had the same rights in purchasing property

for himself as does the public in general.
In purchasing property for himself, a broker is entitled
to contract freely with the seller just as other buyers do.
And, as with buyers in general, the broker who purchases property for himself does not become liable to the owner's
broker for a commission.

The law places all liability for
-19-
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payment of such a commission on the owner.

Steinberg v.

Buchman, 167 P.2d 207, Keyes Co. v. Island Fox Motel, Inc.,
260 So.2d 894, Moss v. Sperry, 191 So. 531, Webster v. Hochberg,
245 N.E. 2d 529, McDaniel v.

~cCauley,

371 P.2d 486, 12 AM.

JUR. 2d Brokers §§ 163-4, 12 C.JeS. Brokers § 82, 3 AM. JUR.
2d Agency§ 247.

If a commission is due Taylor National on

the sale of the Barrinqton House, it must look solely to
Jensen Bros. for its recovery.
In purchasing the Barrington House, Harward did not
subject himself to liability for Taylor National's commission
in any other way.

In early September 1977 Harward contacted

a representative of the owner, Leon Jensen, when he became
interested in the house.
lines

(Record at 32, lines 17-19; 98,

He was told by Leon Jensen that Jensen Bros.'

8~20.)

broker would contact him about arranging negotiations.
16~20~

at 98, lines

261, lines

9~13.)

(Record

Leon Jensen then made

repeated attempts to have the broker, Taylor National, contact Harward.

It failed to do so.

Instead, Taylor National's

president left town for a ten day visit to Hawaii, no other
representative of Taylor National contacted Harward,

(Record

at 90), and Taylor National ultimately took the position that
Harward would have to contact Taylor National to arrange a
purchase.

(Record at 49-51, 59, 89, 91-93.)

Only after Jensen

Bros. became frustrated over Taylor National's refusal to
contact Harward did Jensen Bros. and Harward begin to talk
together about the actual terms for the purchase of the
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Barrington House~
8-18.)

(Record at 100, lines 13-23~ 263, lines

This was 3 weeks to a month after Jensen Bros. had

first requested Taylor National to contact Harward!

(Record

at 33, line 8; 88, lines 10-27; 263, lines 19-22.)
As the buyer, Harward had no legal duty to contact the
listing broker.

Rather, as shall he established hereafter,

it was Taylor National's duty to contact the prospective
purchaser.

It failed to do so.

Any right to a commission

asserted by Taylor National must be asserted against Jensen
Brothers, and the judgment of the lower court granting
Taylor National the right to recover the amount of its
broker's fees through Jensen Bros. and against Harward,
Harrison, and Soule should be reversed.

III
TAYLOR NATIONAL IS NOT ENTITLED TO
A COMMISSION RESULTING FROM THE SALE OF
THE BARRINGTON HOUSE
A.

TAYLOR NATIONAL HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT IT IS
ENTITLED TO A REAL ESTATE SALES COMMISSION.

In an action for the recovery of a real estate sales
commission, the burden of proving that he is entitled to a
commission rests with the real estate broker. 12 AM. JUR. 2d
Brokers

§

248 (1979).

To sustain this burden, the broker

must first prove that he was authorized to act as the agent
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for the seller.

Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1960),

Pattee v. Moody, 166 Kan. 198, 199 P.2d 798

§

JUR. 2d Brokers

248, 12 C.J.S. Brokers

~

(1948), 12 AM.
15 (1979).

And he

can do so only by proving the extistence of an express contract of agency.

Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915
56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640 (1920),

(Utah 1930), Case v. Ralph,

Gleichenhaus v. Pratt, 190 Kan. 1, 372 Po2d 273 {1962). In
addition, the broker must prove that he acted pursuant to
the contract, and that it was not entered into after his performance .
... {I)t is not enough to merely allege an agreement or
promise to pay the broker for services already rendered
whether made directly to the broker or to some third
person, but before a broker can recover he must allege
and prove an express contract of employment in pursuance
of which services were rendered which entitle him to
recover the commission agreed upon.
Smith Realty Co.
v. Dipietro, 292 P. at 917.
In many jurisdictions, the broker has the additional burden
of proving that the agency contract meets the requirements
of the Statute of Frauds.

Beazell v. Schrader, 59 Cal. 2d

577, 30 Cal. Rptr. 534, 381 P.2d 390 (1963), Reilly v. Maw,
146 Mont. 145, 405 P.2d 440 (1965), Record Realty, Inc. v.
Hull, 15 Wash. App. 826, 552 P.2d 191 {1976), 12 CcJ.S.
Brokers § 15.

In Utah, however, where an express contract

is alleged, it will be ''presumed to be in writing until the
contrary is made to appear."

Case v. Ralph, 188 P. at 643.

Once he has proven an express contract of agency, the
broker must show the performance of his undertaking.
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Porter

v. Hunter, 207 P.

§ 248.

153 (Utah 1922), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers

He must prove that he acted in accordance with the

terms of his contract.
(Utah 1953).
volunteer~

Patterson v. Blair, 257 P.2d 944

The broker cannot recover a commission as a

he must show a contract of agency broad enough to

cover the particular transaction on which he seeks to base
his commission.

Gleichenhaus v. Pratt, 372 P.2d 273, 12 C.J.S.

Brokers § 60.
To recover a comm1ss1on, then, the broker must prove
that he has fulfilled all the conditions precedent to the
duty of the seller to pay.
552 P.2d 191.

Record Realty, Inc. v. Hull,

Ordinarily, this means that the broker is

required to prove that he produced a buyer who was ready,
willing and able to purchase on terms acceptable to the seller.
Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1960), Campbell v.
Fowler, 214 Kan. 491, 520 P.2d 1285 (1974), Winkelman v.
Allen, 214 Kan. 22, 519 P.2d 1377 (1974), Record Realty v.
Hull, 552 P.2d 191.

And he must prove further that he was

the efficient, or procuring, cause of the sale.

Link v.

Patrick, 367 P.2d 157 (Alaska 1961), Campbell v. Fowler, 214
Kan. 491, 520 P.2d 1285 (1974), Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d
1377, Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d 105, Hiniqer v. Judy, 194
Kan. 155, 398 P.2d 305 (1965), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 248.
Before a real estate broker is entitled to a commission
it is necessary for him to establish not only that he
was authorized to act as defendant's agent, but also
that he produced a purchaser ready, willing and able
to buy on the terms prescribed by the owner, and that
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he was the efficient agent or procuring cause of the
sale.
Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d at 107.
The broker must sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence.

12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers

§

248, C.J.S. Brokers

§ 15.
In this action, Taylor National seeks recovery of a real
estate sales commission.
lines 1-5.)

(Record at 17, lines 19-30 to 18,

In order to recover that commission, however,

Taylor National must prove that it was authorized to act as
agent for the seller, Jensen Brothers Construction Co.,
Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d 105, Pattee v. Moody, 199 P.2d
798, under an express contract of agency.

Smith Realty Co.

v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915, Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640..
haus v. Pratt, 372 P.2d 273.

Gleichen-

Taylor National must further

prove that the actions which entitle it to a commission were
performed pursuant to that contract, and that the contract was
entered into before the commission was due.
v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915.

Smith Realty Co.

It must prove that its actions were

in accordance with the terms of the contract.
Inc. v. Hull, 552 P.2d 191.

Record Realty,

Taylor National must further

prove, absent a contract to the contrary, that it produced a
buyer who was ready, willing and able to purchase on terms
acceptable to the seller, Link v. Patrick, 367 P.2d 157,
Fistell v. Thomas, 355 P.2d 105, Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d
1377,

Hiniger v. Judy, 398 P.2d 305, Campbell v. Fowler,

520 P.2d 1285.

Taylor National has not sustained this burden
-24-
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by the required preponderance of the evidence, as will be
demonstrated hereafter.
B.

TAYLOR NATIONAL HAS NOT PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF AN
EXPRESS CONTRACT OF AGENCY ON WHICH A BROKER IS
REQUIRED TO BASE HIS COMMISSION.
1.

THE LISTING AGREEMENT INTRODUCED AT THE TRIAL
AS EXHIBIT 19 CONTAINS THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF THE OFFER MADE BY JENSEN BROTHERS TO TAYLOR
NATIONAL.

Before he may recover in an action for a real estate
sales commission, a broker must prove that he acted pursuant
to an express contract of agency.

(For citations, see p.4.)

The broker's right to a commission is measured by the terms
of his contract.

(For citations, see p. 4.)

tract must be in writing.

And that con-

UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4, Smith

Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915, Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640.
Taylor National has failed to carry its burden of
proving the existence of a valid contract of agency entitling
it to recover a commission upon the sale of the Barrington
House.

It bases its right to a recovery in this action on a

writing introduced at the trial as Exhibit 9.
lines 27-30 to 18, lines 1-5.)

(Record at 17,

This instrument, however,

does not represent the terms offered to Taylor National by
Jensen Brothers Construction Co.
The offer made by Jensen Bros. is more accurately reflected
in the listing agreement introduced at the trial as Exhibit
19.

Exhibit 19 is the carbon copy which was attached to

Exhibit 9 when Marvin Jensen signed it on behalf of Jensen
-25Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Bros.

The circumstances surrounding the preparation of the

listing agreement and Marvin Jensen's signing it were explained at the trial by Paul Taylor, formerly

President of

Taylor National, as follows:
Q

Okay. And I'll show you Exhibit Nine and ask you if
you can identify that?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

What is that?

A

That's a Utah County Board of Realtor's form for
single residential listing.

Q

And is that the Listing Agreement under which you
claim a real estate commission?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Now, do you -- strike that.
Tell the Court the
circumstances under which that was executed and how
it came to your possession.

A

The Listing Agreement was prepared in writing in the
presence of the Jensen Brothers. We felt that we
wanted to have it typed. So we took it back to our
office and had our secretary type it.

Q

You wrote it out in pencil first?

A

Right.

Q

Okay.
Then went back to your office and had your
secretary type it?

A

Right.

Q

Then what haopened?

A

Then we delivered it to the Jensen Brothers for
their signature. And either the Jensen Brothers
delivered the final executed copy to us, or someone
from our staff picked it up.
I'm not sure of which.

(Record at 17, lines

27~30

to 18, lines 1-22.)

After signing the instrument, Marvin Jensen returned the top
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copy and kept the carbon, Exhibit 19.
21-29.)

(Record at 129, lines

Since Exhibit 19 is a carbon of the writing signed

by Marvin Jensen, the impressions of any handwritten notations made on the top copy (Exhibit 9) should show through on
the carbon

unless they were added after the copies were

separated.
But there are handwritten notations on Taylor National's
copy,

(Exhibit 9),

which do not appear on the carbon (Exhibit

19).

On the top of the page the words "Not on multiple" and

"Office Exclusive" have been added to Exhibit 9.

In addition,

the blank next to the "Date Listed" has been filled in with
either the numbers "6-1-77" or "7-1-77."

And the blank next

to the "Date Expired" has been filled in with the numbers
"12-1-77."

Under the blank for "salesman" the names "Bryce

& Paul Taylor" have been added.

Finally, it was stipulated

by counsel for Taylor National at trial that the writing had
been signed at the bottom by a representative of Taylor
National after this suit was filed.

(Record at 20-21).

Be-

cause these handwritten terms are not present on the carbon
copy,

(Exhibit 19), it may be inferred that they were not

present on the writing when Marvin Jensen signed it.

But,

in addition, Paul Taylor testified that at least one of the
terms was added by a secretary at Taylor National,

(Record

at 18, lines 23-27, 19, lines 15-18), and he presumed that
other additions were made by the secretary also.
at 19, lines 3-5).

(Record

Since Taylor National wanted to have the
-27-
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document typed before Jensen Bros. signed it, it is not likely
that the secretary would fill in most of the blanks with the
typewriter and then fill in the others by hand before delivering the instrument to Jensen Bros.

After all, Taylor

National did not want a handwritten listing agreement;
that was the reason for having it typed in the first place.
(Record at 18, lines 9-11.)
The handwritten additions which appear only on Exhibit
9 were added after Marvin Jensen returned the writing to
Taylor National.

Exhibit 9, therefore, does not reflect the

terms and conditions of the offer made by Jensen Bros. to
Taylor National.
in Exhibit 19.

Those terms and conditions are set forth
And Exhibit 19 is the contract on which Taylor

National must rest its right to a commission.
This fact has ramifications which prevent Taylor National
from claiming a commission in this action.

For an addition

of a term to an instrument, such as here alleged, may constitute a material alteration.

WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1902.

And "{t)he intentional or material alteration of a written
contract, by a party entitled to any benefit under it destroys
the integrity of the instrument and extinguishes all executory
obligations of the contract in his favor."

Bishop v. Rain-

holdt, 79 Cal. App. 2d 568, 180 P.2d 416, 419
Ct. App. 1947)' WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS ~ 1902.

(Calif. Dist.
The test of

materiality is whether the instrument will have the same
legal effect after the alteration as it did before.
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WILLISTON

ON CONTRACTS§ 1902, Briggs v. Sarkeys, Inc., 418 P.2d 620,
624

(Okla. 1966).
In the present case, the additions are material --

especially the additions of the listing and expiration dates
of the contract.

For these dates define the time for per-

formance of the contract.

They establish the duration of

Jensen Brothers' liability to Taylor National for a commission
on the sale of the house and set the date upon which Jensen
Bros. is free to sell the property without liability to
Taylor National.

Without an expiration date, a listing agree-

ment lasts, at most, for a reasonable time.

The addition of

the expiration date to the writing, however, may cause the
agreement to endure for more than a reasonable time.

This

makes all the difference to Taylor National if a sale of the
property is made after a reasonable amount of time has
elapsed, but before the expiration date which was added to
the writing.

Were the expiration date not added to the

writing, Taylor National would not be entitled to a commission.

Without that expiration date specified in the writing,

the passage of a reasonable time for performance does not
operate to deny Taylor National its commission.
A listing agreement which does not contain a listing
date and an expiration date lacks the definite terms necessary
to create a contract.

Without those terms, the writing is

so vague that it cannot be enforced.

When those dates are

present on a listing agreement, it is apparent that the parties
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came to a meeting of the minds over the time for performance.
In the present case, the additions of the terms "Office
Exclusive" and "Not on multiple" create ambiguities in the
contract which affect the broker's right to a commission.
For, as discussed later, a broker's listing agreement must
grant an exclusive agency or an exclusive right to sell
unambiguously within the four corners of the writing.

Foltz

v. Begnoche, 222 Kan. 383, 565 P.2d 592 (1977). Wilkins v. W.B.
Tilton Real Estate and Ins., Inc., 257 So.2d 573, 575 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1971).

When the additions are read in connec-

tion with the terms of the listing agreement in the present
case, it is difficult to ascertain whether the listing
agreement grants an exclusive right to sell, an exclusive
agency, or an open listing to Taylor National.

Consequently,

the additions materially alter the legal affect of the
instrument.
After Marvin Jensen signed the listing agreement on
behalf of Jensen Bros., he returned it to Taylor National,
who had possession of it until this suit was filed.

The

additions were made to the writing after it was delivered
to Taylor National.

Further, Paul Taylor stated his presump-

tion that the additions were made by the secretary to Taylor
National.

Because the alterations in the writing are material,

and because the evidence establishes that employees of Taylor
National made them, Taylor National is not entitled to recover under the listing agreement introduced at trial as
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Exhibit 9.

All executory obligations in favor of Taylor

National were extinguished by the alterations.
There are further reasons for finding that Exhibit 19
contained the terms and conditions which were offered by
Jensen Bros.

For the listing agreement specifies that, by

signing, the owner acknowledges receipt of a copy of the
agreement.

{Exhibit 9, Exhibit 19e)

In addition, Utah law

imposes a duty on the broker to provide the owner with copies
of all listings and agreements of sale contracts.
ANN.

§ 61-2-11.

Neither Leon nor Marvin Jensen ever saw

Exhibit 9 after it was signed by Marvin Jensen.
97,124, 130.)

UTAH CODE

{Record at

The only copy of the listing agreement which

Jensen Bros. had was Exhibit 19.

Therefore by the terms of

the listing agreement which it prepared, Taylor National is
estopped to deny that the copy of the listing which Jensen
Bros. retained was a valid copy of the agreement.

Any

listing agreement which does not conform to the terms set out
in Exhibit 19, therefore, is invalid.

Because it differs

in several material aspects from the offer made by Jensen
Bros.,

Exhibit 9 May not be asserted by Taylor National

as the contract of agency.
2.

TAYLOR NATIONAL FAILED TO ACCEPT THE OFFER MADE
BY JENSEN BROS., CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS NO
CONTRACT OF AGENCY ON WHICH TAYLOR NATIONAL
MAY BASE A RIGHT TO A COM.MISSION.

Before a contract can be said to exist, the parties must
come to a meeting of the minds.
of Utah.

Pinqree v. Continental Group

558 P.2d 1317 {Utah 1976), Morgan v. Bd. of State
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Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976), Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah
2d 83, 368, P.2d 597 (1962), Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d
61, 362 P.2d 427 (1961), E.B. Wicks v. Moyle, 137 P.2d 342
(Utah 1943), Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101 (Utah 1926).
Consequently, an acceptance containing terms which vary from
those of the original off er does not lead to a binding
tract.

con~

Instead, it is said to be both a rejection of the

original offer and a counteroffer.

Minneapolis & St. L. Ry.

Co. v. Columbus Rolling-Mill Co., 119 U.S. 149 (1886), C.H.
Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Assoc., Inc., 90 Ida. 502, 414 P.2d
873 (1966), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 58.
In the present case, Taylor National alleges a right
to a commission based on the writing introduced as Exhibit
9.

(Record at 17-18.)

As previously established, Exhibit

9 does not contain the terms and conditions of the offer

made by Jensen Bros.

(Exhibit 19).

Accordingly, the parties

never came to a meeting of the minds and no contract can be
said to exist.

Taylor National's additions to the terms of

the offer made by Jensen Bros. operated as both a rejection
and a counteroffer to Jensen Bros.' offer.

There is no

evidence to indicate that Jensen Bros. ever accepted this
counteroffer.

In fact, representatives of Jensen

Bros~

not aware that changes had been made in the listing
rnent until the time of the trial.

were

agree~

(Record at 97, 124, 130.)

Furthermore, because a broker must base his right to a commission on a written contract, Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro,
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292 P. 915, Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640, Taylor National may
not claim a meeting of the minds to some contract other than
Exhibit 9 or 19 which was not in writing.
No contract ever came into being between Taylor National
and Jensen Bros. because there was never a meeting of the
minds between the two parties.

Therefore, Taylor National

may not recover in this action to collect a real estate
sales commission because it has not proven the existence of
a valid contract on which a broker is required to base his
commission.
Even if Exhibit 9 (Taylor National's copy of the listing
agreement) were found to be a valid contract of agency, there
would still be no contract because Taylor National failed to
accept the offer made by Jensen Bros.

Acceptance of an offer

may be made in several different ways.

17 C.J.S. Contracts

§ 41.

And signing a document constitutes an acceptance of

its provisions.

17 C.J.S. Contracts § 41.

"In case of doubt

an offer is interpreted as inviting the cfEeree to accept
either by promising to perform what the offer requests or
by rendering the performance, as the offeree chooses.
~~1ENT

(SECOND)

RESTATE-

CONTRACTS § 31.

In the present case there is little doubt as to the
method of acceptance contemplated by Jensen Bros.' offer.
The listing agreement provides a space for the signatures of
both the listing owner and the broker.

It requires each

party to sign in consideration of the signature of the other
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each party promises in consideration of the other party's
promise, and a bilateral contract arises.

This listing agree-

ment was provided by Taylor National, which did nothing to
contradict the expectations raised by the instrument

that

each party would indicate its promise to be bound by its
signature.

As a result, Jensen Bros. expected Taylor National

to indicate its assent to the terms of the instrument by
signing it.

(Record at 130, lines 17-20.)

But Taylor

National never gave its promise in exchange for the promise
made by Jensen Bros.

In the first place, Jensen Bros. was

never given a copy of the listing agreement signed by Taylor
National, and there is no evidence to indicate that Taylor
National ever gave its promise to perform at any time prior
to the beginning of this suit.

In the second place, any

attempted acceptance which Taylor National made by signing
the listing agreement was ineffective because it was signed
after the occurance of the event allegedly giving rise to
a commission.
Utah law does not prevent an owner and broker from

enter~

ing into a special contract which provides for a broker's
commission on the happening of a certain event.

Watson v.

Odell, 58 Utah 276, 198 P. 772 (1921), Patterson,_2.. Blair,
257 P.2d 944 (Utah 1953).

And in this case, Taylor National

does not allege that it procured the ultimate purchaser of
the Barrington House, which is the ordinary method of earning
a commission.

Consequently, it must base its claim to a
-34-
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commission on special terms in the listing agreement.
Taylor National alleges that the event giving rise to its
right to a commission is the sale by any party, of the
Barrington House.

The terms of the listing agreement provide:

... if said property or any part thereof is sold,
leased or exchanged during said term by myself or
any other party, I agree to pay you a commission
of 6% for such sale, lease or exchange.
(Exhibits
9 &-19, paragraph 2.)
But Taylor National must prove that its contract was
in force at the time that event occurred in order to be
entitled to commission.

915.

Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P.

In Smith Realty, the court indicated that a broker is

not entitled to a commission on a contract entered into
after the happening of the event.
If, as indicated by Mr. Justice Frick in Case v. Ralph,
Supra, it was there necessary to allege an express
contract of employment, so here, the complaint to be
sufficient must contain such an allegation.
It
follows that it is not enough to merely allege an
agreement or promise to pay the broker for services
already rendered whether made directly to the broker
or to some third person, but before a broker can recover he must allege and prove an express contract of
employment in pursuance of which services were rendered
which entitle him to recover the commission agreed
upon.
292 P. at 917.
(Emphasis added.)
To be entitled to a commission on the sale of the Barrington House, then, Taylor National must show that it accepted
Jensen Bros.' offer before the sale of the house.
not proven this fact.

It has

For the Barrington House was sold in

late 1977, while Taylor National did not sign the listing
agreement until after June 7, 1978.

(Record at 20, lines
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29-30 to 21, lines 1-3.)

Taylor National entered into the

contract of agency by signing the listing agreement after any
right to a commission was due.
recover in this action.

Consequently, it may not

Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro., 292

P. 915.
In any event, Taylor National's power of acceptance
had been terminated before it accepted the listing agreement
by signing it.

For as shall be demonstrated hereafter,

Jensen Bros.' offer had been revoked or had lapsed, having
been extended for more than a reasonable time.

And either of

these occurances operate to terminate an offeree's power of
acceptance.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS§ 35(1).

Having failed to show that it accepted Jensen Bros.'
offer by signing the contract, Taylor National must demonstrate that it accepted by performing according to the terms

of the offer.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS

~

31.

Taylor

National has failed to demonstrate this.
Ordinarily, a broker's listing agreement, whether it
grants the broker an exclusive right to sell, an exclusive
agency, or merely an open listing, is viewed as an offer
for a unilateral contract.

Tetrick v. Sloan, 339 P.2d 613

(Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), Baumgartner v. Meek, 272 P.2d
552 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1954),

c.

Forsman Real Estate Co.

v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511, 547 P.2d 1116 (1976)' 12 AM. JUR. 2d
Brokers § 32.

This unilateral view of the agency contract

is acknowledged by the Utah Statute of Frauds, which requires
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only the signature of the owner on the writing.

A writing

is sufficient under the statute if it is "subscribed by the
party to be charged therewith."

UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4.

Acceptance of the unilateral offer made in a broker's
listing agreement may be only by full performance.

Barnard

v. Hardy, 293 P. 12 (Utah 1930), Porter v. Hunter, 207 P.
153 (Utah 1922), Clements v. Rankin, 189 P.2d 725 (Calif.
Dist. Ct. App. 1948), C. Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch,
547 P.2d 1116, Wilkins, v. Tilton, 257 So.2d 573 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971), Craib v. Committee on National Missions, 62
Mich. App. 617, 233 N.W. 2d 674 (1975).
It is clear that a real estate broker's employment
contract is usually a unilateral agreement which the
broker may accept only by full performance. C. Forsman
Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 547 P.2d at 1120.
A broker is not entitled to compensation until he has
performed the undertaking assumed by him.
135 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1943).

Roscow v. Bara,

He must accomplish what he under-

took to do in his contract of employment -- nothing short of
that will entitle him to compensation.

Spartz v. Rimnac,

208 N.W. 2d 764 (Minn. 1973), Libowitz v. Lake Nursing Home,
Inc., 35' Wis. 2d 74, 150 N.W. 2d 439 (1967), Fenton v. Bancroft
Hotel Assoc., Inc. 265 So. 2d 67.

A broker is not entitled

to compensation for unsuccessful efforts.

Id~

Diehl & Assoc.,

Inc. v. Houtchens, 567 P. 2d 931 (Mont. 1977).
Full performance means that the broker has performed the
act required of him, the procuring of a buyer ready, willing
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and able to purchase on the owner's terms.

A broker may not

recover for time and money expended in unsuccessful attempts
because the broker is hired for his skill in arranging a sale
of the property.

The owner is not hiring merely an advertis-

ing agent, but the object of the broker's employment is to
bring buyer and seller together and consummate a sale of the
property.

The broker's efforts in advertising the property

and showing it to likely prospects are merely supplementary
to the main object of his employment.

Until an opportunity

to sell on the owner•·s terms is presented, the broker has
not performed the object of his employment.

Not having per-

formed, he cannot l:e said to have accepted an offer for a uni-.
lateral contract.

In the instant case, Taylor National, in

order to accept the terms of the listing agreement and be
entitled to a commission, must have fully performed the terms
of its contract.

And that portion of the contract upon

which the right to a commission is premised reads:
During the life of this contract, if you find a party
who is ready, able and willing to buy, lease or exchange said property or any part thereof, at said
price and terms, or any other price or terms, to
which I may agree in writing, or if said property
or any part thereof is sold, leased or exchanged
during said term by myself or any other party, I agree
to pay you a commission of 6% for such sale, lease or
exchange.
(Exhibits 9 & 19~)
The performance required by Taylor National under the contract is no different from that in most other listing agreernents.

The broker must procure a buyer who is ready, willing

and able to purchase, or otherwise exchange the property, on
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the terms agreed to by the sellers

Taylor National has

failed to prove that it ever fully performed under the contract.

While it presented offers to the owner, it did not

present anyone who was ready to purchase on the terms
specified by the owner, either in the listing agreement or
through further negotiation.

(Record at 51-2.)

Because Taylor National never fully performed under the
listing agreement, it cannot be said to have accepted by
performance, the offer for a unilateral contract made by
Jensen Bros.

And, as previously established, Taylor National

failed in any other way to accept the terms and conditions
offered by Jensen Bros.

Having failed to accept the terms

of the contract, Taylor National may rot now benefit by its
exclusive right to sell provisions to gain a commission.
3.

THE OFFER MADE BY JENSEN BROS. DID NOT CONTAIN
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS, AND WAS NOT A VALID CONTRACT OF
AGENCY.

A valid contractual offer must contain definite and
certain terms.
OF CONTRACTS

Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 640, RESTATEME"NT (SECOND)

§ 32.

The Utah Statute of Frauds requires that

these terms be in writing when the contract employs a broker
to purchase or sell real estate for compensation.

UTAH CODE

ANN. § 25-5-4, Smith Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. 915, Case

v. Ralph 188 P. 640.
The court interpreted the Statute of Frauds to require
that the writing contained the terms and conditions of the
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broker's employment.
The statute is in force in a number of the states of
the Union, and has by the courts of last resort in
those states frequently been applied.
The courts
generally hold that under such a statute a real estate
broker or agent cannot recover commission for services rendered in either selling or procuring a purchaser for real property unless it appears:
(1) that
there is an express contract or agreement of authority
in which the terms and conditions of his employment,
if any, and the amount of his commission, etc., are
stated; (2) that such contract be in writing ... Case
v. Ralph, 188 P. at 642.
(Emphasis added.)
As the Court said in Fritsch v. Hess, 49 Utah 75, 162
P. 70, 71, "It is well settled that no particular form of

words is necessary to comply with this statute, and that
almost any kind of writing will be sufficient if it be signed
by the party sought to be charged and contains the essential
terms of a contract."

(Emphasis added.)

The Court in Smith

Realty Co. v. Dipietro, 292 P. at 917, denied recovery of a
broker's action for a commission.

The Court observed that

the alleged contract was insufficient because, among other
things, nothing was said in the writing "as to terms, conditions, time or description of the property."
It is generally accepted that an offer to contract, to
be sufficient, must contain specific terms and conditions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 32.

More specifically,

the courts have held that a broker's contract should state
the name of the broker, Smith v. Dipietro, 292 P. at 917,
the time for performance, Id., particularly the expiration
date, Olson v. Neale, 116 Ariz. 522, 570 Pe2d 209 (Ariz. App.
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1977), and show, unequivocally, the employment of the broker.
Maricopa Realty & Trust Co. v. V.R.D. Farms, Inc., 10 Ariz.
App. 524, 460 P.2d 195, Sanstrum v. Gonser, 140 Cal. App. 2d
732, 295 P.2d 532, Lathrop v. Gauger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 754,
274 P.2d 730.
In the instant case, the listing agreement does not contain "the essential terms of a contract."
162 P. 71.

Fritsch v. Hess,

For as previously established, the writing relied

on by Taylor National is not the offer made by Jensen Bros.
And the writing which Jensen Bros. offered to Taylor National
does not contain the terms and conditions required either
by the Statute of Frauds or principles applicable to contracts in general.

The terms missing here include the time,

or duration, of performance (particularly the exoiration date),
and the unequivocal employment of the broker.
Where the duration of the contractual relationship
has not been specified, the law generally implies that it
will last for a reasonable time (after which it will be terminable at will by either party).

Consolidated Theatres v.

Theatrical Employees Union, 69 Cal. 2d 713.

Employment con-

tracts, however, do not last for a reasonable time, but are
generally terminable at will by either party.

Atchison Topeka

& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Andrews, 211 F2d 264.
Such is not the case where real estate broker's employment contracts are concerned, however.

Several state statutes

require that the duration of the listing agreement be stated
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explicitly in the writing.

Bangle v. Holland Realty Inv. Co.,

80 Nev. 331, 393 P.2d 138 (1964), Saye v. Paradise Memorial
Gardens, Inc., 92 Nev. 526, 554 P.2d 274

(1976), Summers v.

Freeman, 128 Cal. App. 2d 828, 276 P.2d 131, and where no such
statute exists, the courts have required the writing to contain an expiration date.
Taken together, it seems to us that the public policy
of this state is that brokers, in order to collect a
commission, must have a written listing, that the
listing must contain a definite expiration date, and
the listing agreement shall be deemed to cancel automatically on that date.
Olson v. Neale, 570 P.2d at
209.
The policy of the Utah Statute of Frauds, likewise,
requires that the dates of commencement and termination of
the listing agreement be stated explicitly.

Broker's listing

agreements have been included within the Statute of Frauds
.
in order to protect landowners from fraud and unfounded claims
of brokers.

Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205

(Utah 1976),

Featherman v. Kennedy, 122 Mont. 256, 200 P.2d 243 (1921),
Roseberry v. Heckler, 84 Ariz. 247, 326 P.2d 365, Lathrop v.
Gauger, 127 Cal. App. 2d 754, 274 P.2d 730.

A contract which

does not specify its duration is too indefinite for the
parties to enforce among themselves; what is a reasonable
time to the owner may not be reasonable to the broker who has
yet to procure a buyer.

Where the law requires that the

duration of the broker's contract be stated explicitly, it
reduces the likelihood of disputes over the issue of what
constitutes a reasonable time for the duration of the listing,
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and it should be observed that the real issue in such disputes
is whether the owner is liable any longer to the broker for
a commission.

Where the duration of a broker's employment has

been specified in his listing agreement, he is less likely to
be successful in bringing an unfounded claim against the listing
owner.

Both broker and owner will have the same expectations

as to the termination date of the contract.

This is especially

valuable where a contract purports to grant the exclusive
right to sell or an exclusive agency, or where the broker
is entitled to a commission on a sale consummated months after
the contract's termination to any prospect procured originally
by the broker.
In all of these instances, the owner gives up certain
rights to sell his property without liability to another.

An

exclusive right to sell prevents the owner from selling the
property on his own without incurring liability to the listWilkins v. W.B.Tilton Real Estate & Ins., Inc.

ing broker.
257 So.2d 573

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).

And an exclusive

aqency prevents the owner from listing his property with any
other broker.

Id.

But the right to sell one's own property

is an inherent right which can only be surrendered in explicit
language.

Lambert v. Haskins, 263 P.2d 433

(Colo. 1953),

Foltz v. Begnoche, 565 P.2d 592, Wilkins v. W.B. Tilton Real
Estate & Ins. Inc., 257 So. 2d 573.

And a contract which

does not specify the duration for which the owner relinquishes
such rights is more indefinite than explicit.
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Utah law should

require that a real estate broker's listing agreement state
explicitly the duration of the contract.

Having failed to

prove an express contract of agency which complies with the
Statute of Frauds, Taylor National may not recover in quantum
meruit or under an implied contract.

Case v. Ralph, 188 P.

640, Diggins v. Johnson, 513 P.2d 660

(Alaska 1973), Robert-

son v. Hansen, 89 Idaho 107, 403 P.2d 585 (1965), Isaguirre

v. Echevarria, 96 Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 471 (1975), Baugh v.
Darley, 184 P.2d 335 (Utah 1947), Watson v. Odell, 58 Utah
276, 198 P. 772, 41 A.L.R. 2d 905.

The Court in Case v.

Ralph stated:
... in the absence of such an express contract no
recovery can be had for the reasonable value of the
services rendered as upon a quantum meruit, nor for
money and time expended for the use and benefit of the
owner of the property.
It is also held that performance or part performance of a parol agreement is
unavailing.
188 P. at 642.
And the Court said in Watson v. Odell, 198 P. at 775, "Under
our statute, the plaintiff could recover a commission only
by virtue of a contract.

He could not recover as upon a

quantum meruit."

C.

IF TAYLOR NATIONAL HAD A CONTRACT OF AGENCY, IT
LAPSED BEFORE THE OCCURANCE OF THE EVENT GIVING
RISE TO A COMMISSION, HAVING ENDURED FOR A REASONABLE TIME.

Where the duration of a broker's agency is not specified
in the listing agreement, it does not last indefinitely.
broker must perform according to the terms of the listing
--44Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The

within reasonable time.

24 ALR 1540, 1547, Robertson v. Wilson,

121 Wash. 358, 209 P. 841 (1922), Parkey v. Lawrence, 284 S.W.
283 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1926), Cocquyt v. Shower, 189 P. 606
(Colo. 1920), 12 CJS Brokers§ 88, Harris v. McPherson, 97 Conn.
164. 115 A. 723, 24 ALR 1530 (1922), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers
§54, Martyn v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. of West
Palm Beach, 257, So. 2d 576

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), Clark

v. King, 209 Mo. App. 309, 238 S.W. 825 (1922), Reitz v. Oglebay
251 S.W. 771 (Mo. App. 1923), Boggs v. McMickle, 206 P.2d 824
(Colo. 1949).

Whether a broker has performed according to

his contract within a reasonable time is a question of fact,
Vidler v. DeBell, 270 P.2d 120 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1954),
which depends on the particular circumstances of each case.
12 CJS Brokers § 88, 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 54, Boggs v.
McMickle, 206 P.2d 824, Clark v. King, 238
Oglebay, 251 S.W. 771.

s.w.

825, Reitz v.

Among the facts to be considered are

the nature and character of the service, the magnitude of the
undertaking, the intention of the parties, and all other pertinent facts and circumstances.

12 CJS Brokers § 88.

The bur-

den rests with the broker to prove that he performed within
a reasonable time.

24 ALR 1548.

As previously established, Taylor National's contract
of agency failed to specify an expiration date.

(Exhibit 19.)

If the Court finds that the expiration date is not required
by the Statute of Frauds on a contract purporting to grant an

exclusive right to sell or an exclusive agency, Taylor National
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has still failed to prove that it performed within a reasonable time.
When given the name of a prospective purchaser -- in
fact, the ultimate purchaser -- Taylor National failed to
contact him to even begin negotiations for the sale of the
house.

After prodding Taylor National for three or four

weeks, Jensen Bros. concluded the sale on its own.

Leon

Jensen of Jensen Bros. first asked Paul Taylor of Taylor
National to call Harward in early September 1977.

(Record

at 32, lines 5-28; 98, lines 28-30; 99, lines 1-5.)

He

made one unsuccessful attempt, then left for Hawaii.

For

three to four weeks, Leon Jensen repeatedly asked Taylor
National to contact Harward.

100, lines 1-12.)

(Record at 99, lines

8-30~

Rather than contact Harward, however,

Taylor National took the position that Harward should contact
it.

(Record at 49-51, 59, 89-93.)

Jensen Bros. and Harward

ultimately concluded the sale on their own only after Taylor
National had repeatedly refused to contact Harward.
at 100-102.)

(Record

Before Leon Jensen told Paul Tavlor of Harward's

interest in the Barrington House, Taylor National had failed
to procure any prospects who were willing to meet Jensen Bros.'
terms.

(Record at 30-32, 51-52.)

If the house had been

listed in July 1977, as Taylor National alleges,

(Exhibit 9),

three months had elapsed without one offer which met the
owner's terms -- and this after exposure in the home show.
A broker's failure to attempt to contact a prospect within
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three to four weeks in any case is unreasonable.

Under the

instant circumstances, it was all the more unreasonable.

A

broker who is given the name and telephone number of a likely
prospect and who fails to make a crood faith attempt to contact him within a period of three weeks, has not performed
what his contract reauires of him within a reasonable time.
Consequently, he may not assert that he performed under the
terms of his contract before it lapsed.

In the present case,

Taylor National failed to perform under the contract within
a reasonable time, and has failed to earn a commission on
the sale of the Barrington House.

D.

EVEN IF TAYLOR NATIONAL HAD PROVEN A VALID CONTRACT
OF AGENCY, IT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A CO~.MISSION
BECAUSE ITS AUTHORITY HAD BEEN TERMINATED BEFORE
IT PROCURED A BUYER READY, WILLING, AND ABLE TO
PURCHASE ON JENSEN BROTHERS' TERMS.

To be entitled to a real estate sales commission, a
broker must ordinarily be the procurinq cause of a sale
before his authority has been terminated.

§ 88.

12

C~J.S.

Brokers

The owner may terminate the broker's authority any

time before a sale as long as the contract of agency is not
supported by consideration and the owner has not terminated
in bad faith, that is, to avoid paying a commission on a
sale to a buyer originally procured by the broker.

Flinders

v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314, 208 P. 526, 530 (1922), 12 AM. JUR.
2d Brokers §§ 55, 222.

12 C.J.S. Brokers

~
~·

66.

While some

jurisdictions hold that the owner cannot revoke where the
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agency is exclusive, 12 AM. "TUR. 2d Brokers § 58, or where
the contract is to last for a definite time period, 12 AM.
JUR.

2d Brokers, § 56, this

l.S

not the case in Utah.

In Flinders v. Hunter, 208 P. 53 0 I

the Utah court set

out the conditions under which an owner could terminate a
broker's contract of agency.
It will thus be seen that where, as here, the appointment is not supported by any consideration, although
the authority to sell is in terms exclusive and a
fixed period of time is named, yet the owner can
terminate the authority at any time before a sale is
effected by the broker, and the broker has no claim
against the owner for commission or otherwise unless
the broker alleges and proves that the authority was
terminated in bad faith and for the purpose of selling
to one of his customers by the owner himself to avoid
the payment of a commission. 208 P. at 530.
In the present case, because Jensen Bros. terminated
its authority, Taylor National has no claim for a "commission

.

or otherwise."

Id.

Tavlor National has failed to show that
.J.

the listing agreement here was supported by consideration.
It bases its claim for a recovery in this action solely on
the listing agreement introduced at the trial as Exhibit 9.
(Record at 18.)

Nowhere in that writing is there a reference

to the consideration furnished by the broker.

And in connec-

tion with the termination of a broker's authority, the acts
required of him under the contract are not the kind of
consideration contemplated by the law.

28 A.L.R. 893.

An owner may terminate his broker's authority as long
as he does so in good faith and does not do so to avoid paying
a commission on a sale to a buyer previously procured by the
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broker.

Flinders v. Hunter, 208 P. 530.

It has been said

that the test of bad faith is whether the owner's purpose in
terminating the broker's agency is to avoid payment of a
commission.

Snvder v. Schram, 282 Or. 273, 577 P.2d 935

(1978).

And the burden of proving bad faith rests with the

broker.

Flinders v. Hunter 208 P. 530. Jensen Bros. did not

terminate Taylor National's authority so that it could sell
the property on its own to a buyer procured by the broker
and thus avoid liability for a commission.

Rather, Jensen

Bros. sold the Barrington House to Harward, a purchaser
procured solely by Jensen Bros.

Representatives of Taylor

National were given repeated instructions to contact Harward,
but failed to do so and ultimately took the position that if
he wanted to purchase, Harward would have to contact them.
(Record at 49-51, 58-9, 62, 60, 79, 89, 91-3.)

It was only

after Jensen had failed to get Taylor National to do anything
about contacting its prospect that Jensen and Harward began
negotiations, independent of Taylor National, for the sale
of the Barrington House.

(Record at 149, 98-102.)

At no

time did Taylor National present Jensen Bros. with a ready,
willing and able buyer who had been procured by them.

(Record

at 51-2, 86-7.)
In the face of his own worries about Harward's desire
to purchase "in a hurry" or look elsewhere,

(Record at 103-4,

125.), Jensen gave Taylor National more than a reasonable time
to negotiate a sale.

Jensen Bros. exhibited the utmost good
-49-
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faith in terminatina Taylor National's authority.

Having been

given the name and phone number of a ready, willing, able,
and waiting purchaser, Taylor National's failure to procure
him as a purchaser, thus earning a right to a commission,
can be attributed solely to Taylor National's inaction,
neglect, and intransigence.

Taylor National has failed to

prove bad faith on the part of Jensen Bros. as required by
Flinders.

Thus it may not claim that its authority was wrong-

fully terminated, nor claim a right to recover against Jensen
or Harward.
An owner may revoke the broker's authority by express
notification or the revocation can be implied from the acts
of the parties.

12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 60.

In the instant

case, Jensen Bros. notified Taylor National in September of
1977 that it had contracted to sell the Barrington House to
Harward.

(Record at 33-34.)

In light of the prior dealings

between Jensen Bros. and Taylor National

~-

the numerous

attempts by Jensen Bros. to have Taylor National contact Harward
-- and Taylor National's position that Harward would have to
contact it, if there was to be a sale -- the sale by Jensen
Bros. on its own indicated to Taylor National that its services were no longer being used.

But further, it has been

held that the sale of the property by the owner constitutes
an implied revocation.

Harris v. McPherson, 115 A. 723

(Conn.

1922), Walsh v. Grant, 152 N.E. 884, 885 (Mass. 1926),
Kennedy & Kennedy v. Vance, 202 P.2d 214, 215 (Okla. 1949),
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Trimmer v. Ludtke, 105 Ariz. 260, 462 P.2d 809, 811 (1969),
Roberts v. Gardner, Clarke & Sullivan, 275
(Okla. 1954).

P.2d 245, 247

Some of these cases grant the right to termi-

nate by sale only in nonexclusive situations.

However,

Flinders indicates that the exclusivity of the broker's
listing agreement has no effect on the owner's power to revoke
in Utah.

Jensen Bros. informed Taylor National of the sale,

and the authority to sell was revoked at that time.
Further justification for Jensen Bros.' termination of
Taylor National's authority lies in the fact that Taylor
National did not make reasonable efforts to sell the Barrington House.

The court in Fischer v. Patterson, 86 A.2d 851,

852 (N.H. 1952) indicated that a broker's failure to use
reasonable efforts to sell is a breach of duty, which may
justify rescission of the contract ·of agency.
v. Crocker, 86 A.2d 853

And in Harris

(N.H. 1952) the court held that an

owner's termination of a broker's listinq agreement was
justified where the broker breached his duty to use reasonable
efforts to make a sale.

Finally, in Dixon v. Gustav, 318

P.2d 965 (Wash. 1957), the court held that an owner was
justified in terminating a listing agreement where a broker
holding an exclusive listing rnade no effort to sell.

As

has been discussed, Taylor National first neglected, then
refused, to contact a known prospect.

Taylor National not

only failed to make reasonable efforts to sell, it took no
effort to sell.

Rather it indicated to Jensen Bros. that the

-51Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

buyer would have to make the efforts to effect a sale.

Con-

sequently, Jensen Bros. could have terminated Taylor National's
listinq for its failure to contact Harward.

A broker whose

authority is, in good faith, terminated before he has effected
a sale is not entitled to a commission, even though he may
have devoted time and labor and expended his money.

E.B.

Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 137 P.2d 342.
In the present case, Taylor National's authority was
terminated by Jensen Bros. before it performed under the
contract by procuring a purchaser ready, willing and able to
buy on the owner's terms.

Accordingly, Taylor National was

not entitled to a commission on the sale of the Barrington
House.

E.

EVEN IF TAYLOR NATIONAL HAD PROVEN A VALID CONTRACT
OF AGENCY, JENSEN BROS. WAS FREE TO SELL THE HOUSE
ON ITS OWN WITHOUT INCURRING LIABILITY FOR A REAL
ESTATE SALES COMMISSION.

The right of an owner to sell his own property is inherent,
and is retained when a real estate broker is employed unless
the contract of agency provides otherwise by clear and unequivocal terms.

Dorman Realty & Ins. Co., Inc., v. Stalvey,

212 S.E. 2d 591 {S.C. 1975).

An owner impliedly retains the

right to sell his own property without liability to the broker
unless such right is explicitly waived.

Wright v. Vernon,

183 P.2d 908

(Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1947), Lambert v. Haskins,

263 P.2d 433

(Colo. 1953), J.L. Lemmon Co.~. Oppenheimer,

8 P.2d 679 (Okla. 1932).

As the court said in Peeler Ins. &
-52-
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Realty, Inc. v. Harmon, 20 N.C. App. 78, 200 S.E. 2d 443, 445
(1973), "Since the right of alienation has become such an
integral part of property, it is only proper that the contract
expressly negative this right before it is lost."
The owner's right to sell without incurring liability
to the listing broker may be waived by granting the broker
an exclusive agency or an exclusive right to sell.

Under an

exclusive right to sell, the owner may not sell his property
either by himself or through another broker without incurring
liability for a commission to the listing broker.
Sloan, 339 P.2d 613

Tetrick v.

(Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), E.A. Strout

Western Realty Agency, Inc.

Ve

Gregoire, 225 P.2d 585 (Calif.

Dist. Ct. App. 1951), Foltz v. Begnoche, 222 Kan. 383, 565
P.2d·592 (1977), Dorman Realty & Ins. Co. Inc. v. Stalvey,
212 S.E. 2d 591, Zifcak v. Monroe, 249 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1969).
Under an exclusive agency, the owner may not list his property
with other brokers during the life of the contract.

However,

he is not precluded from selling the property to a buyer procured on his own, and such a sale does not subject him to
liability to the broker for a commission.

Tetrick v. Sloan,

339 P.2d 613, Foltz v. Begnoche, 565 P.2d 592, Zifcak v.
Monroe, 249 A.2d 893, Dorman Realty & Ins. Co., Inc. v.
212 S.E. 2d 591, Bourgoin v. Fortier, 310 A.2d 618

Stal~e~

(Me. 1973).

In the present case, Jensen Bros. procured the buyer of
the Barrington House on its own.

In order to recover a com-

mission, then, Taylor National must prove that its alleged
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listing agreement granted it an exclusive right to sell.
For Jensen Bros. did not list the property with another broker.

And under an exclusive agency contract, the owner may

sell on his own without paying a commission as long as he
does not list the property with another broker.

Under an

open listing contract, the owner may sell to anyone not
procured by his broker.

Nash v. Goar, 94 Ariz. 316, 383

P.2d 871 (1963).
An exclusive right to sell may be created only by clear,
unambiguous language within the four corners of the written
contract.

Foltz v. Begnoche, 565 P.2d 592, J.L. Lemmon Co.

v. Oppenheimer, 8 P.2d 679.

The exclusive right to sell

exists only where it is unequivocally granted in the broker's
contract.

Dixson v. Kattel, 311 So.2d 827

(Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1975), Wilkins v. W.B. Tilton Real Estate & Ins., Inc.
257 So.2d 573,

575

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), Dorman Realty

& Ins. Co., Inc. v. Stalvey 212 S.E. 2d 591.

And use of the

term "Exclusive right" or "Exclusive Listing Contract," by
itself, does not determine whether the written listing agreement grants the broker the exclusive right to sell.

Peeler

Ins. & Realty, Inc. v. Harmon, 200 S.E. 2d 443, Dorman Realty
& Ins. Co., Inc. v. Stalvey, 212 S.E. 2d 591, Suddereth v.
Putty, 446

s.w.

2d 929

(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969), Foltz v.

Begnoche, 565 P.2d 592.
The listing agreement upon which Taylor National seeks
to recover a commission (Exhibit 9)

does not grant an exclusive
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right to sell.

Nowhere in the writing is there a clear,

unequivocal, and unambiguous grant of such a right.

While

the second paragraph of the listing agreement, standing
alone, seems to grant the exclusive right to sell, it is
given only for the "life of this contract."

(Exhibit 9, 19)

And it has been established that Jensen Bros. failed to
specify an expiration date or a listing date when it executed
the agreement.

Consequently, the life of the contract cannot

be determined and the exclusive right to sell is not clearly
and unequivocally granted by the terms of the listing agreement.
Even if Marvin Jensen had been the party who provided
the listing and expiration dates on the instrument, there
would still be an ambiguity present.

For while Paul Taylor

testified that the dates which appear at the top of the listing read "7-1-77" and "12-1-77", (Record at 45), the listing
date could just as easily be read as "6-1-77."

The party

who wrote the numbers in the blank for the "listing Date"
appears to have superimposed the numbers six and seven in
designating the month the listing was to begin.
clear whether it begins in June or July.

It is not

The date on which

the listing is to begin is ambiguous, causing the "life of
the contract" to be ambiguous also.
In the first paragraph of the main body of the listing
agreement, a blank left unfilled creates further ambiguities
regarding the exclusive right to sell.
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In consideration of your agreement to list the property
described herein and to use reasonable efforts to find
a purchaser or tenant therefor, I hereby grant you
for the period of
months from date hereof
the exclusive right to sell, lease or exchange said
property or any part thereof, at the price and terms
stated hereon, or at such other price or terms to
which I may agree in writing.
(Exhibit 9, 19, paragraph 1.)
On its face, the paragraph appears to grant the exclusive
right to sell.

However, that right has been given for a

period of "no months."

In a similar case, the Washington

Supreme Court held that an unfilled blank space where the
commission should have been created no promise to pay a
commission.
(1927).

Black v. Milliken, 143 Wash. 204, 255 P. 101

A similar reading of this listing agreement would

lead to the conclusion that Jensen Bros. intended to give
no exclusive right of sale in this listing agreement.

Had

Jensen Bros. intended to grant the exclusive right to sell
the property it would have specified the duration of that
right in the listing agreement.

It did not, however, and

this fact, taken together with the wording in paragraph two
creates ambiguities. For the wording in paragraph two appears
to grant an exclusive right to sell by creating the right to
a conunission if the property is sold by Jensen Bros. "or any
other party. "

(Exhibit 9, 19.)

paragraphs appear to conflict.

The meaning of the two
As a result, it cannot be

said that they grant the exclusive right to sell clearly,
unequivocally, and unambiguously.
Adding to the ambiguity is the handwritten term at the
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top of Exhibit 9:

"Office Exclusive."

Representatives of

Taylor National, which had the burden of proving a valid
contract of agency, failed to explain the meaning of this
term at the trial.

But even if they had, it would still

create ambiguities in the writing itself.

For an exclusive

right to sell must be granted clearly and unambiguously within
the four corners of the written contract.
565 P.2d 592.

Foltz v. Begnoche,

And the term "Office Exclusive" seems to indi-

cate that Taylor National was intended to be the exclusive
realty office to handle the sale of the Barrington House.
If such were the case, Taylor National would have an exclusive
agency, and not an exclusive right to sell.

For an exclusive

agency prevents the owner from listing his property with
other brokers for sale.

Tetrick v. Sloan, 339 P.2d 613,

Foltz v. Begnoche, 565 P.2d 592, Zifcak v. Monroe, 249 A.2d_
893, Dorman Realty & Ins. Co., Inc. v. Stalvey, 212 S.E. 2d
591, Bourgoin v. Fortier, 310 A.2d 618.

And had Taylor

National desired a more restrictive condition in the listing
agreement it would have had "Exclusive Right to Sell" written
there.

Taken together with the other terms of the contract,

the handwritten term "Office Exclusive" creates ambiguities
regarding the exclusive right to sell provisions of the contract.

Consequently, that right has not been granted within

the four corners of the listing agreement.
Where ambiguities are found in a broker's contract of
agency, they are to be construed against him, especially where
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he prepared the contract of agency.

Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d

510 (Utah 1951), Bob Secolo Realty, Inv. v. Dunnigan, 36 or.
App. 11, 583 P.2d 1154 (Ore. Ct. App. 1978), Foltz v. Begnoche,

565 P.2d 592, E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. v.
Gregoire, 225 P.2d 585, 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers§§ 33, 157,
227.

Where ambiguities exist, they will be construed to

protect the owner.

12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers

§

227.

In the

instant case, representatives of Taylor National testified
that they had the contract of agency typed at their office
and delivered it to Marvin Jensen for his signature.
at 18, 45-46, 129-32.)

(Record

Since Taylor National prepared the

listing agreement, the ambiguities present there should be
construed against Taylor National.

Accordingly, no exclu-

sive right to sell can be said to have been granted in the
listing agreement.

In addition, it has already been seen

that the exclusive right to sell was not granted clearly,
unequivocally, and unambiguously within the four corners of
the writing.

Consequently, Taylor National was not entitled

to a conunission when Jensen Bros. sold the property to a
buyer which it procured on its own .
Even assuming that Taylor National had an exclusive
right to sell, it would still not be entitled to a commission on the Barrington House.

For as previously pointed out,

representatives of Taylor National failed to contact the
ultimate buyer after having been instructed to do so by
Jensen Bros.

Taylor National took the position that the
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buyer should contact the broker to effect a sale.

Yet in

Schoenmann v. Whitt, 136 Wis. 332, 117 N.W. 851, the court
held that the owner could sell his land without incurring
liability to the broker under a listing agreement granting
an exclusive right to sell because the broker had not accepted
the implied obligations of the instrument by using ordinary
diligence to make a sale of the property.

Here, Taylor

National did not use ordinary diligence in arranging for a
sale with Harward.

Furthermore, in Huchting v. Rahn, 179

Wis. 50, 190 N.W. 847, the court held that under an exclusive
right to sell, "the broker cannot remain idle and expect a
commission upon a sale effected through the efforts of the
owner."
The evidence establishes that Taylor National was not
given an exclusive right to sell the Barrington House.

But

even if it was given such a right, it failed to meet its
obligations of diligence and Jensen Bros. was free to sell
the property, in any case, without incurring liability for a
broker's commission.
F.

TAYLOR NATIONAL MAY NOT RECOVER A COMMISSION BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SALE
OF THE BARRINGTON HOME.

Unless his contract of employment is to the contrary,
a real estate broker must be the procuring cause of a sale
or transaction in order to be entitled to a commission.
Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 utah 2d. 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962
Essres Realty & Ins., Inc. v. Zeff, 512 P.2d 650 (Colo.
-59-
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ct.

App. 1973), Kern v. Lewis, 472 P.2d 713 (Colo. Ct. App.
1970), Hiniger v. Judy, 194 Kan. 155, 398 P.2d 305 (1965),
Bartsas Realty, Inc. v. Leverton, 409 P.2d 627

(Nev. 1966),

Bonanza Real Estate, Inc. v. Crouch, 10 Wash. App. 380, 517
P.2d 1371 (1974), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 189, 12 C.J.S.
Brokers

§

9la.

Ordinarily, the broker becomes entitled to a

commission when his principal accepts the party procured by
him and the two of them enter into a binding contract.
Mattingly-Lusky Realty Co. v. Camper, 15 S.W. 2d 240, 241 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1929), Bonanza Real Estate, Inc. v. Crouch, 517 P.2d
at 1375.

As the court said in Kern v. Lewis,

Before a broker can be said to have earned his commission, he must produce a purchaser ready, willing
and able to buy on the owner's terms, and he must be
the efficient agent or procuring cause of the salee
Kern v. Lewis, 472 P.2d at 714.
Whether a broker has been the procuring cause of a
sale depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266, 269
(1962.), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 190.

However, several guid-

ing principles have been outlined by the courts.
The term "procuring cause" as used in describing a
broker's activity refers to a cause originating a
series of events which, without break in their continuity, result in accomplishment of the prime objective of employment of the broker, producing a purchaser
ready, willing, and able to buy real estate on the
owner's terms.
Clark v. Ellsworth, 66 Ariz. 119,
18 4 p . 2 d 8 21 ' 8 2 2 ( 19 4 7) .
The Utah Court has set down the following guidelines to
determine whether a broker has been the procuring cause in a
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sale of real estate:
It is undoubtedly true that a broker employed to negotiate a sale of real estate may recover compensation
for his services when a customer has been procured
by him who is able, willing, and ready to purchase
upon the terms named by the seller, even though the
sale is not completed; for in such case, the service
is performed, the parties brought together, and the
opportunity to sell is presented to the owner of the
property.
But in order that it may be said that a
customer has been "procured," it certainly is necessary that the seller and the buyer be, in some way,
brought together so that the seller has the opportunity to sell, the opportunity to do which is, after
all, the purpose of the employment between the owner
and the broker.
This has not been accomplished, that
is, the opportunity to sell has not been presented to
the owner, unless the broker has either made such a
contract with the purchaser, in case the purchaser's
identity be not disclosed, following the terms fixed
by the owner, as will bind the purchaser to the payment of damages in case of breach by the purchaser, or
the seller and the buyer are brought together so that
the seller can deal directly with the buyer.
If
neither of these conditions exist, then no opportunity
to sell has been brought to the owner, and the proposed customer has not been "procured" in the sense
in which that word is used in a broker's contract.
Fritsch v. Hess, 162 P. at 71-72.
Taylor National has failed to prove that it was the
procuring cause of the sale of the Barrington House.

It was

certainly not the "cause originating a series of events" which
resulted in the sale of the house.

For while representatives

of Taylor National manned the house during the home show,
(Record at 22, lines 13-23; 28, lines 9-27; 29, lines 7-22),
no evidence was presented to show that Taylor National showed
the home to Harward,

(recorded at 350-351), or opened nego-

tiations with him for purchase of the house.

Harward con-

tacted Jensen on his own some time after the home show had
ended to arrange to purchase the house.
-61-
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8-14.)

Rather than attempting to bring Harward and Jensen

Bros. to an aqreement on the sale of the home, representatives of Taylor National took the position that it was the
buyer's responsibility to contact the broker to arrange a
(Record at 49-51, 59, 89, 91-93.)

sale.

Taylor National did nothing to play an active role in
bringing the parties together

to conclude a sale.

After in-

forming Taylor National that Harward was interested in purchasing the Barrington House, Jensen instructed Taylor National representatives to contact Harward.

They failed to do

(Record at 31, lines 28-30; 32, lines 1-26.)

this.

Instead,

Paul Taylor made one unsuccessful attempt to contact Harward
and left for Hawaii.

Upon his return, he still failed to

bring Harward and Jensen Bros. together.
Q

When you returned from Hawaii, why didn'·t you
attempt to complete the transaction with Leon
Jensen -- or with Leon Harward? I'm sorry.

A

You•ve heard my testimony on that,

Q

Weren't you in control?

A

I was not.

Q

As the listing agent, wasnft it your responsibility
to handle the closing?

A

It should have been, according to procedure.
I would
like to have been in control.
Thatrs my great concern
is that I lost control.

Q

Did you make any attempt to contact Leon Harward to
handle the transaction?

A

No.
{Record at 49, lines 16-29.)

Counsel~

-62Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

But even if Taylor National had first shown the property
to Harward or had opened negotiations with him, this alone
would not be sufficient to constitute the procuring cause.
For a broker who merely introduces the parties to the transaction to each other, without further action on his part
cannot be said to be the procuring cause of a sale which is
later consummated without him.
App. 446, 409 P.2d 730, 733
732

Hurley v. Kallof, 2 Ariz.

(1966), Rohs v. Hickam, 473 P.2d

(Colo. Ct. App. 1970), Kern v. Lewis, 472 P.2d 713

(Colo.

Ct. App. 1970), Mattingly-Lusky Realty Co. v. Camper, 15 S.W.
2d 241.

And where the broker merely mentions to the prospec-

tive purchaser that the ·property is for sale, his actions
are not sufficient to constitute procuring cause.
v. Blair, 123 Utah 216, 257 P.2d 944
398 P.2d at 315.

Patterson

(1953), Hiniger v. Judy,

The broker must keep the lines of comrnuni-

cation open between himself and the prospective buyer.

Hurley

-v. Kallof, 409 P.2d 733.
Because Taylor National was not the procuring cause of
the sale of the Barrington House, it is not entitled to
recover a commission in this action.

G.

TAYLOR NATIONAL IS NOT ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION
ON THE SALE OF THE BARRINGTON HOUSE BECAUSE IT
BREACHED THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES WHICH IT OWED TO
JENSEN BROS.

A broker must represent the interests of his employer
with good faith, and must discharqe his duties with reasonable
skill and diligence.

Reich v. Christopulos, 256 P.2d 238,
-63-
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240 (Utah 1953), Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P.2d
410, 412

(1958), Shatz Realty Co. v. King, 10 S.W. 2d 456,

458 (Ky. Ct. App. 1928), 12 C.J.S. Brokers §§ 23, 26, McMenarnin

v. Bishop, 6 Wash. App. 455, 493 P.2d 1016 (1972), Vivian
Arnold Realty Co. v. McCormick, 19 Ariz. App. 289, 506 P.2d
1'074

(1973), Geise v. Taro, 92 Idaho 243, 440 P.2d 521 (1968),

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

AGE~~y

§ 401.

A fiduciary relationship

exists between the broker and principal.

Reese v. Harper,

329 P.2d 412, and he is under a duty to follow the instructions

of his principal.

E.A. Strout Realty Agency v. Wooster, 99

A.2d 689 (Vt. 1953), Lowrance v. Swaffield, 123 So. Car. 331,
116 S.E. 278

(1923), Shatz Realty Co. v. King, 225 Ky, 846,

10 S.W. 2d 456, 60 A.L.R. 1374 (1928), 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 25.
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to
obey all reasonable directions in regard to the manner of performing a service that he is contracted to perform."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY§ 385 (1958).

It is the principal's

judgment, not the agent's, that is to control.

E.A. Strout

v. Wooster, 99 A.2d at 692.
Furthermore, a broker must make reasonable efforts to
sell the property.

94 ALR 2d 468, 473 § 5, Fitzpatrick v.

Federer Realty Co., 351

s.w.

2d 673

(Mo. 1961),

Fischer v.

Patterson, 97 N.H. 318, 86 A.2d 851 (1952), Sieqel
-v. Rosenzweig,
129 App. Div. 547, 114 NYS 179 (1908), Hayes v. Clark, 111 "A.
781 (Conn. 1920).

His failure to do so may be grounds for

revocation of his contract of agency and loss of his opportunity
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to earn a commission.
852.

Fischer v. Patterson, 86 A.2d 851,

And a broker's efforts should be greater where he holds

an exclusive agency, because the owner is more dependent
on that one broker for the sale of the property, Id.
A broker's failure to discharge his duties in good
faith and with reasonable skill and diligence precludes his
recovery for the service he purports to be rendering.

Reese

v. Harper, 329 P.2d 412, Reich v. Christopulos, 256 P.2d
240, 12 AM JUR 2d Brokers § 96.

The broker is not entitled

to a commission if he breaches his fiduciary duties.
v. Bulleri, 25 Ariz. App. 357, 543 P.2d 478

Mason

(1975).

In the instant case, Taylor National is not entitled to
a commission because it has failed to discharge its duties in
good faith, with reasonable skill and diligence, and because
it has breached its fiduciary duties.

First, Taylor National

failed to follow the instructions of its principal, Jensen
Bros. Construction.

When Jensen Bros. learned that Harward

was interested in purchasing the Barrington House, he contacted Paul Taylor at Taylor National, gave him Harward's
telephone number, and instructed him to contact Harward.
(Record at 31-2, 98-99).

After one unsuccessful attempt to

call Harward, Paul Taylor left town for Hawaii.
31-32).

(Record at

While he was out of town, Bryce Taylor did nothing

to contact Harward.

(Record at 90.)

Rather than following

Jensen Bros.' instructions, Taylor National instructed Jensen
Bros. that it was Harward's duty to contact it.
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(Record at

49-SO, 51, 59, 91-93, 89).

Taylor National did not follow

the instructions of Jensen Bros., but rather, told Jensen
Bros. that it would not follow those instructions.

Leon

Jensen's instructions were reasonable, in that he only asked
Taylor National to call Harward on the phone to begin negotiations.

In fact, Jensen was providing the way for Taylor

National to begin earning its commission.

Taylor National

had a duty to follow Jensen's instructions and contact Harward.
Its failure to do so after Jensen had repeatedly requested
such represents a breach of its fiduciary duty and precludes
recovery of a commission.
It should be noted that there were no valid reasons for
Taylor National's refusal to contact Harward after being
instructed to do so by its principal, Jensen Bros.
representa~ives

For while

of Taylor National claim that they did not

have a duty to contact Harward because he was a real estate
broker, they never ascertained this fact for a reasonable
certainty.

Thus, at the trial, held over a year after the

transactions in question, representatives of Taylor National
had still not determined whether or not Harward was a real
estate agent and were still referring to him as "the alleged
broker."

(Record at 92, lines 6-20.}

Whether he was a

broker or not, however, was irrelevant because he was not
arranging to sell to another, but really was just another
buyer.

On the other hand, Taylor National representatives did

know that Harward was a prospective buyer.

And when they failed

-66~
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to contact him, they breached their duties of diligence to
Jensen Bros.
Taylor National did not take reasonable efforts to sell
the property.
tract.

This too, precludes its recovery on the con-

Representatives of Taylor National were given a known

prospect -- Harward.

They never contacted him.

All Taylor

National was asked to do was contact Harward to ask if he
was willing to purchase on Jensen's terms.

Once having

determined that he was, Taylor National could have brought
the two parties together and a sale could have been consummated
Rather, Taylor National chose to do nothing -- it sat back
waiting for Harward to call.

(Record at 44-51, 59, 89, 91-93.)

These are certainly not reasonable efforts

from a broker

who wishes to earn a commission by selling a house, and are
not reasonable actions under these circumstances.
Taylor National had been neither reasonably diligent nor
skilled in its handling of the sale of the Barrington House.
It is, therefore, by reason of its breach of its fiduciary
duty owed to the owner, not entitled to a commission when
Jensen and Harward ultimately negotiated the sale themselves.

H.

TAYLOR NATIONAL IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER A COMMISSION ON THE SALE OF THE BARRINGTON HOME BECAUSE
IT ABANDONED ITS AGENCY.

A real estate broker is not entitled to a commission on
a sale which is consummated after he abandoned his agency.
Vincent v. Weber, 13 Ohio Misc. 280, 232, N.W. 2d 671 (Ohio
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Mun. 1965), Bonanza Real Estate, Inc. v. Crouch, 10 Wash. App.
380, 517 P.2d 1371 (1974), 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers

12 C.J.S. Brokers § 65.

§

223

(1979),

He will be denied a commission even

if he brought the parties together, or opened

negotiations,

but later abandoned further efforts to conclude a sale and
it was concluded by another.
Zeff, 512 P.2d 650

Essres Realty & Ins., Inc. v.

(Colo. Ct. App. 1973), Parrish Vo Ragsdale

Realty Co., 135 Ga. App. 491, 218 S.W. 2d 164 (1975), Baird

v. Madsen, 57 Cal. App. 2d 465, 134 P.2d 885 (Calif. Dist. Ct.
App. 1943), Hurley v. Kallof, 2 Ariz. App. 446, 409 P.2d 730
(1966), 12 AM.JUR. 2d Brokers § 223.

A broker will be found

to have abandoned his agency whenever he has ceased his efforts
to accomplish the purpose of his employment.

Mattingly-Lusky

Realty Co. v. Camper, 15 S.W. 2d, 240, 241 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929).
Whether a broker has abandoned his agency is a question
of intent, Lathem v. Coleman, 134 SoW. 2d 703

(Texc Civ. App.

1940), Trinity Gravel Co.~. Cranke, 282 SoWo 798 modifying
Cranke v.
---

Trinity Gravel Co., 272 SoW. 604, Bradley v. Blandin,

-

94 Vt. 243, 110 A. 309

(1920h 12 C.J.S. Brokers

§

65, and is

dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each particular
E.A. Strout Realty Agency, Inc. v. Wooster, 99 A 2d

case.

0

689 (Vt. 1953), Bradley v. Blandin, 110 A. 309, Macwilliams

v. Bright, 273 Md. 632, 331 A.2d 303 (1975), 12 AM. JUR. 2d
Brokers

§

223.

In the instant case, Taylor National was instructed
several times to contact Harward to arrange a sale of the
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Barrington House.

(Record at 98-100).

At no time did

representatives of Taylor National contact Harward, however.
Paul Taylor even testified that he neglected the matter.
Q

In September of 1977, did you have any contact
with people at Jensen Brothers concerning a prospective sale to Harward?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And what was the first contact you had in that respect?

A

Leon Jensen called me, and he called me to indicate
that he wasn't too happy with the quantity of advertising that was being done, in the process informed me that he had a buyer for the home who was
a licensed real estate salesman.

Q

And did he tell you who it was?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And who did he say it was?

A

Leon Harward.

Q

And what were you do to, in respect to your company?

A

He gave me Mr. Harward's telephone number and suggested that I call him.

Q

Do you remember the approximate date of that telephone call?

A

That would be early in September.

Q

Did you call Mr. Harward?

A

I attempted, once.

Q

And did you reach him?

A

No.

Q

What happened next?

A

I was involved in a trip to Hawaii and the call was,
I forgot it, neglected it.

•••

(Testimony of Paul Taylor, Record at 31, lines 29-30:
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32, lines 1-26.)
Taylor National has abandoned its agency by failing to
follow a known lead at the specific instructions of its principal.

By so doing, Taylor National ceased its efforts to

accomplish the purpose of its employment.
Realty Co. v. Camper, 15 S.W. 2d 240, 241.

Mattingly-Lusky
Accordingly, when

the Barrington House was sold, Taylor National was not entitled
to a com.mission, having already abandoned its agency.

IV

JENSEN BROS. IS LIABLE TO HARWARD FOR DAMAGES
FLOWING FROM THE BREACH OF AN IMPLIED
WARRANTY THAT THE HOUSE WOULD BE BUILT IN A WORKMANLIKE
MANNER AND WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR HABITATION.
The rule of caveat emptor, applied at one time to the
purchase of new homes, no longer meets the needs and realities
of modern home buying.

As a result, an increasing number of

courts have been unwilling to apply the rule.
The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is
an anachronism patently out of harmony with modern
home buying practices. It does a disservice not
only to the ordinary prudent purchaser but to the
industry itself by lending encouragement to the unscrupulous, fly-by-night operator and purveyor of
shoddy work. Jeanguneat Ve Jackie Harnes Construction
Co., 576 P.2d 761, 763 (_Okla. 1978), [quoting Humber
v. Morton, 426 S.W. 2d 544, 562 (Tex. 1968) e]
In place of the rule of caveat emptor, courts have irnposed an implied warranty of quality in the sale of new homes.
Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 115 Cal. Rptre 648,
525 P.2d 88

(1974).

The court in Pollard discussed the

reasons for the
imposition of such a rule.
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In the setting of the marketplace, the builder or seller
of new construction -- not unlike the rnanuf acturer or
merchandiser of personalty -- makes implied representations, ordinarily indispensable to the sale, that the
builder has used reasonable skill and judgment in constructing the building. On the other hand, the purchaser does not usually possess the knowledge of the
builder and is unable to fully examine a completed
house and its components without disturbing the finished
product. Further, unlike the purchaser of an older
building, he has no opportunity to observe how the
building has withstood the passage of time.
Thus he
generally relies on those in a position to know the
quality of the work to be sold, and his reliance is
surely evident to the construction industry.
Pollard
v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 525 P.2d at 91.
The court concluded that "builders and sellers of new
construction should be held to what is impliedly

represented

that the completed structure was designed and.constructed
in

a reasonably workmanlike manner."

Id.

The implied

warranty that a home is built in a reasonably workmanlike
manner and is suitable for habitation has recently been
applied in several jurisdictions surrounding Utah.
Spencer, 585 P.2d 922
430 P.2d 469
399

Belt v.

(Colo. Ct. App. 1978), Mulhern v. Hederich

(Colo. 1967), Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d

(Colo. 1964),

Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Hornes, Inc., 578

P.2d 637 (Colo. 1978), Jeanguneat v. Jackie Harnes Construction
Co., 576 P.2d 761, Yepsen v. Burgess, 525 P.2d 1019 (Ore.1974),
Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1972).
This warranty is a form of strict liability, Chandler v.
Bunick, 279 Or. 353, 569 P.2d 1037 (1977), Gay v. Cornwall,
494 P.2d 1371, and the builder may be liable for damages for
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breach of the warranty, Belt v. Spencer, 585 P.2d 922, even
where he has exercised reasonable care, or even all possible
care.

Chandler v. Bunick, 569 P.2d at 1039.

Consequently,

he is liable for the cost of remedying the defects.

Gay v.

Cornwall, 494 P.2d 1371.
The measure of damages for a breach of the warranty is
the difference between the actual value of the property at
the time it was sold and its value if it had been as warranted.
Glisan v. Srnolenske, 387 P.2d 260, 263

(Colo. 1963).

However,

where the buyer has retained and used the property, he may
make reasonable expenditures to put the property into conforrnity with the warranty.

Id~

Where he does so, the cost

of such expenditures may represent his measure of damages. Id.
In the case aptly titled House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d
199 (Wash. 1969), Mr. and Mrs. House purchased a new house
from a

builder~vendor.

After a short period of time, cracks

started to appear in the walls and the doors didn't fit
their frames because the foundation was slipping.

The

Houses brought suit for rescission of the contract of sale.

In holding for the Houses, the Court observed that there
was nothing more vital to a house than a stable foundation.

And the court held that it didn't matter whether the defect
in the foundation was a result of the ground itself or the
foundation's design.

The court concluded:

We apprehend it to be the rule that, when a vendorbuilder sells a new house to its first intended
occupant, he impliedly warrants that the foundations
-72Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

supporting it are firm and secure and that the house
is structurally safe for the buyer's intended purpose of living in it. House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d at 204.
In numerous other cases, the courts have given relief to the
purchasers of new homes for unstable foundations which gave
rise to cracked walls, warped floors, and doors which did not
properly fit their frames.

Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Hornes,

Inc. 578 P.2d 637, Belt v. Spencer, 585 P.2d 922, Mulhern
v. Hederich, 430 P.2d 469, Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d
399, Glisan v. Smolenske, 387 P.2d 260.
The evidence in this case indicates that Jensen Bros.
breached the implied warranty of habitability in connection
with the Barrington House.

Jensen Bros. was the builder and

seller of the Barrington House, and the home was new when
purchased by Harward -- he is its first and only occupant.
The testimony at trial indicated that the outside foundation of the Barrington House is settling at a faster rate
than the center foundation.

(Record at 231-232.)

This has

caused large cracks in the brick and inside walls, movement
in the walls, cracks in the concrete floor of the garage,
and doors that no longer fit their frames properly.
at 231-235, 376, 409-410.)

(Exhibits 44A-44K.)

(Record

These damages

are very similar to those on which recovery was granted in
the case of House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199, Duncan v.
Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d 637, Belt v. Spencer,
585 P.2d 922, Mulhern v. Hederich, 430 P.2d 469, Carpenter v.
Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399, and Glisan v. Srnolenske, 387 P.2d 260.
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At the trial, a general contractor specializing in building
construction repair (Record at 231, 374} testified as to the
extent and measure of damage to the Barrington House.

After

a careful and detailed examination of the home, he set forth
the needed repairs in particular, and estimated the cost to
make such repairs at $5,602.31.

(Record at 377.)

Represen-

tatives of Jensen Bros. even admit to these damages, although
they contest the cost of repairing them.

(Record at 408-410.)

Nevertheless, the foundation of the Barrington House is not
"firm and secure", House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d at 204, and
the resulting damages are substantial.

Jensen Bros. is liable

for those damages even if it had proven that it exercised
all possible care in constructing the Barrington House.
Belt v. Spencer, 585 P.2d 922, Chandler v. Bunick, 569 P.2d
at 1039, Gay v. Cornwall, 494 P.2d 1371, House v. Thornton,
457 P.2d 199.
Harward is entitled to recover from Jensen Bros. either
the difference in value between the house if it had been as
warranted and as it now is, or the cost of reasonable expenditures in putting the house into conformity with the warranty.
Glisan v. Smolenske, 387 P.2d 260.

Consequently, the holding

of the lower court, that there was no cause of action against
Jensen Bros., should be reversed and damages in the amount of
$5,602.31 should be awarded to Harward for repair to the
Barrington House to put it into conformity with the warranty.
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v
JENSEN BROS. COMMITTED FRAUD IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE
TO HARWARD THAT THE IMPROVEMENTS FOR
THE SUBDIVISION HAD NOT BEEN APPROVED AND THAT
THE SUBDIVISION HAD, THEREFORE, NOT BEED ACCEPTED
BY THE OREM CITY COUNCIL.
An allegation of fraud ordinarily will not lie unless
each element thereof has been proven by the aggrieved party.
Dugan v, Jones, No. 16334 (Utah filed July 23, 1980), Cheever
v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (.Utah 1978), Pace v. Parrish
122 Utah 141, 247

P~2d

273 (1952), Stuck v. Delta Land & Water

Co., 227 P.791, 795 (Utah 1924).
It may be stated generally that the elements of actual
fraud exists of: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (_3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge
of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted upon by the person and
in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's
ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance upon its
truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) his consequent and proximate injury.
Stuck v. Delta Land &
Water Co., 227 P. 795 (quoting 26 C~J. 1062).
Fraud may exist in the suppression of the truth as well as
in the representation or suggestion of falsehood, however,
Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802, 804

(1963).

Thus, silence, where there is a duty to conununicate material
matters known by one party, may become actionable fraud.

Id.,

Griffith v. Byers Constr. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 212 Kan. 65,
510 P.2d 198 (1973).
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he
knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject
to the same liability to the other as though he had
represented the nonexistence of the matter that he
has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under
a Sponsored
dutiby theto
the
~ther
to exerci;e
to
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disclose the matter in questionG
TORTS.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

This duty to disclose material facts arises when the
parties to a transaction share a confidential or fiduciary
relationship.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 551 (2)

(a)

I

Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978).
The breach of a duty by the dominant party in a confidential relationship may be regarded as constructive
fraud.
It is unnecessary for the plaintiff to show an
intent to defraud; constructive fraud is an equitable
doctrine employed by the courts to rectify injury
resulting from breach of the obligation implicit in
the relationship. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d at 302.

A duty to disclose may also exist where a relationship of
trust exists between the parties or where there is inequality
of condition and knowledge.
A

Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802.

party to a transaction who has sole knowledge or access to

material facts and knows that such facts are not known or
reasonably discoverable by the other party is also under a
duty to disclose them.

Goodman v. Kennedy, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375,

556 P. 2d 737 (1976).
Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated
transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as to
certain facts is a factor in determining that a duty
of disclosure is owing. There is abundant authority
to the effect that if one party to a contract or
transaction has superior knowledge or knowledge which
is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the
other party and which he could not discover by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowledge
which are not open to both parties alike, he is under
a legal obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes fraud, especially when the other party relies
upon him to communicate to him the true state of facts
to enable him to judge of the expediency of the bargain or transaction.
37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit
§ 148.
Whether there is a duty to disclose must ultimately be
determined by "reference to all existing circumstances and by
-76-
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comparing the facts not disclosed with the object and end
in view by t~e contracting parties."
P.2d 802,

Elder v. Clawson 384

(quoting 23 AM. JUR. 856 Fraud & Deceit §78), 37

AM. JUR. 2d Fraud &

Deceit~

148.

When the law imposes the duty on a party to disclose
matters material to a transaction, he must disclose those
facts which are known to him or those which could reasonably
have been known through exercise of reasonable care.
v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979).

Stepanov

And a fact is

material when a reasonable person would attach importance
to it in determining his choice of action in the transaction
in question.

Timi v. Prescott State Bank, 220 Kan. 377, 553

P.2d 315 (1976), Griffith v. Byers Construction Co. of Kansas,
Inc., 510 P.2d 198.
A party proving fraud may rescind the contract and
render back what he has received under it, at the same time
suing for what he has parted with, or he may affirm the
transaction and maintain an action in deceit.
590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979).

Mecham v. Benson

In determining the measure of

damages, Utah follows the ''benefit of the bargaid'

rule: the

aggrieved party is entitled to the difference between the
actual value of what he received and the value if it had been
as represented.

Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602

(Utah 1974),

Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 386, 424 P.2d 136 (1967).
Harward's claim of fraud against Jensen Bros. arises
out of the failure by Jensen Bros. to disclose that the
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improvements for the subdivision in which the Barrington House
was located had not been accepted by the Orem City Council.
(Record at 226, lines 16-30 to 227, lines 1-3.) As explained
at trial by the Orem City Director of Public Works,

"The

street improvements are not accepted until such time as they
are all installed properly and the final inspections are made."
(Record at 226, lines 25-27.)
The improvements in the subdivision where the Barrington
House is located were not ultimately installed properly and
accepted until October 15, 1979.
to 227, lines 1-3).

(Record at 226, lines 29-30

But after their initial installation,

the roads, gutters and sidewalks began to deteriorate badly.
The situation was described by

a

resident of the subdivisi6n

who lived three blocks from Harward:
A

... So just recently things have really looked a lot
better. But before that, it looked like a war zone.

Q

What do you mean by that?

A

Nothing but decaying streets. A lot of places there
was no asphalt.
Just, it looked like some places
the streets had never even been put in before they
were fixed.

(Record at 253, lines 11-19.)

Q

And the street out front of your house is, you've
described it as "a war zone," that's the worst in
the whole subdivision, isn't it?

A

No, I described that it was "a war zone" until things
were fixed.
Now it's a normal street.

Q

Okay. But the problems for the street in front of
your house were worse than the rest of the subdivi~
sion?

A

No.
In fact ours was probably one of the better spots
in the subdivision.
-78-
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Q

Whoever put the streets in had problems in putting
the streets in all over the subdivision, then?

A

I would say, correct.

(Record at 254, lines 9-20.)
At times a four wheel drive vehicle was required to get in
and out of the subdivision.

(Record at 376.)

the sidewalks and gutters needed repairing.

Furthermore,
(Record at 254,

lines 28-30.)
Of the twelve homes on the street where the Barrington
House is located, seven were for sale at the time of the
(Record at 307-308.)

trial.

Yet in the two years prior

to the trial, only one home on the street had been sold by
its original owners.

(Record at 308.)

Harward himself has

been trying,unsuccessfully at this point, to sell the Barring(Record at 307, lines

ton House since the summer of 1978.
10-17.)

Largely because of the poor condition of the streets,

it had been impossible to sell the house prior to October 1979.
(Record at 367, lines 17-19.)

(The slipping foundation makes

the home almost impossible to sell at the present time.)
The failure, by Jensen Bros., to disclose that the
subdivision improvements had not been accepted was a material
fact.

A buyer who knew that the roads, sidewalks, and gutters

had not been accepted would have been
they might have contained defects.

put on notice that

This fact would surely

have raised questions about the future property values in
the subdivision and the wisdom of investing in the Barrington
House.

It is self-evident that one seeking to purchase a
-79-
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home will take future property values into account in his
decision; a home is the largest and most important investment
most people ever make.

They are not likely to make such an

investment knowing that the road leading to the home is substandard,

a possibility for future problems, and a lia-

bility in future attempts to sell the home.
The nonacceptance of the subdivision's improvements by
the City of Orem is a fact to which any reasonable person
would attach importance in determining whether or not to
purchase the Barrington House.

Consequently, it is a material

fact. Timi v. Prescott State Bank, 553 P.2d 315, Griffith v.
Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc., 510 P.2d 198.
That the improvements for the subdivision had not been
accepted by the Orem City Council is a fact which could have
been known to Jensen Bros. by the exercise of reasonable
care.

Stepanov

Ve

Gavrilovich,

594 P.2d 30.

It was the

builder of the house and the party which had to go through
the preliminary paperwork, such as obtaining building permits,
prior to construction.

Furthermore, Jensen Bros. was connected

with the Barrington House from the very beginning until its
sale to Harward.

Harward, on the other hand, came upon the

scene after the home had been completed in a subdivision of
other homes.

In spite of its superior knowledge, Jensen

Bros. never informed Harward that the subdivision's improvements had not been accepted.

{Record at 421, lines 3-15.)

Because Jensen Bros. knew, or could have known by the
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exercise of reasonable care, that the improvements had not been
accepted it could have disclosed this fact to Harward.
Jensen Bros. had a duty to disclose the non-acceptance
of the subdivision's improvements because of its superior
knowledge and because of the inequality of condition between
the two parties.

While Jensen Bros. knew or should have known

that the subdivision had not been accepted, this fact was
not reasonably discoverable by Harward.

From first outward

appearances, Harward saw what appeared to be a completed
subdivision.

In fact, representatives of Taylor National

came to this same conclusion when they first saw the property
and did not feel the need to make any further investigations
regarding the matter.

(Record

a~

66-69.) Furthermore, the

defect in the subdivision was not patent to the ordinary
purchaser.

Neither Harward, nor any other buyer, would have

seen anything to put him on notice that the improvements were
defective, and had not been accepted.

Furthermore, the

acceptance of an entire subdivision is beyond the normal
purview of a single individual buying only one house.

Jensen

Brose, on the other hand, had representatives associated with
the house through the entire period of its planning and
construction.

It was familiar with the

subdivision and,

as a major builder and developer, was familiar with the
procedures necessary for obtaining approval of the improvements in the subdivision.

This superiority of knowledge

placed a duty on Jensen Bros. to disclose to Harward that the
subdivision's improvements had not been installed properly,
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and as a result had not been approved by the Orem City Council.
Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802, Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d
737, 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud & Deceit§ 148.
It is obvious that Jensen Bros. withheld information about
the subdivision's improvements in order to induce the sale.
Had Harward, or any other buyer, known that the roads, sidewalks
and gutters had not been installed to the satisfaction of the
City of Orem, he would not have purchased.

Jensen Bros.

had not had any offers for the house which met

its

expec-

tations before Harward expressed interest, and Jensen Bros.
was anxious to sell.

That the nondisclosure of the infor-

mation about the improvements had the effect of inducing the
sale is evident by the fact that Harward purchased.
Harward has been injured as a result of Jensen Bros.'

-

nondisclosure of material information.
him $140,000 is now worth essentially

The house that cost
nothin~

Prior to the time that the foundation's
slippage became readily apparent,

(and was not a discourage-

ment to buyers nor of great concern to Harward) , the conditions of the streets and sidewalks made the home unapproachable
Had the home been without its present defects, it would still
have been impossible to sell.

Now that the problems in the

roads have been remedied, Harward's house has slipped to a
degree that it has caused cracks to be obvious to even the
casual observer.

The improper improvements in front of his

house caused Harward to lose his chance to sell the Barrington
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House before its other deficiences became apparent to the
degree that they made the house undesireable.

Because of

this, he has been injured to the extent of $140,000, or the
difference in the actual value of the Barrington House and
the value of the house if it had been as it was represented.
Lamb v. Bangart, 525

P.2d 602, Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424

P.2d 136.
After an examination of all the facts and circumstances,
it is apparent that Jensen Bros. committed fraud when it
failed to disclose to Harward that the improvements in the
subdivision had not been approved by the Orem City Council.
This case is analogous in many respects to the situation in
Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802.

There, the seller failed

to disclose the existence of, and economic effect upon

the

operation of the land, of a quarantine due to a noxious weed.
As a result, Plaintiff, who purchased the land, was prevented
from using the farm to any material economic advantage.
Although the buyers knew of the existence of the weed on the
land, they did not know of the quarantine imposed upon the
property.

As the court said, "There was no occasion for them

to make an independent investigation of a quarantine of which
they knew nothing."

Id. at 804.

In the present case, Harward had no reason to know that
the roads and sidewalks surrounding the Barrington House had
not been approved by the property city authorities.

Conse-

quently, there was no occasion for him to make an independent
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investigation of the matter.

But, their subsequent deterior-

ation caused him to lose the economic benefit of his property
-- it appears to be impossible to sell the house at the
present time.

The deteriorated roads, like the quarantine

on the farmland, prevented Harward from realizing the benefit
of his economic investment.

And as in Elder, the party in

this case with superior knowledge withheld it.

The court in

Elder found that the seller had a duty to disclose the information about the quarantine.

Likewise, in this case, the

seller has a duty to disclose what amounts to an economic
quarantine.

Jensen Bros. fraudulently and intentionally

withheld the facts relating to the nonacceptance of the subdivision's improvements, which were facts known to it and
not to Harward.

This information was withheld, in spite of

a duty to the contrary, for the purpose of inducing the sale
of the Barrington House and had that effect.

Consequently,

Jensen Bros. is liable to Harward for his resulting losso
The ruling of the trial court, that Harward had no cause of
action against Jensen Bros., is in error and should be reversed with an appropriate award of damages to Harward.

VI
JENSEN BROS. IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT IT AGREED TO
ACCEPT LAND FROM HARWARD IN EXCHANGE FOR EQUITY
IN THE BARRINGTON HOUSE, AND MAY NOT SEEK TO
ENFORCE THE TRUST DEED NOTE THROUGH A TRUSTEE'S SALE.
From the beginning of negotiations over the Barrington
House, Leon Harward proposed -- and Jensen Bros. accepted -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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an offer to exchange ground for Harward's equity in the house.
Specifically, the trust deed executed and dated October 28,
1977 (Exhibit 59) in the amount of $45,600 was to be reduced
by a trade for other property.

At the trial, Jensen Bros.

claimed that it never agreed to such an arrangement.

Rather,

it sought an order from the court allowing it to enforce the
terms of the note through a trustee's sale of the Barrington
House.

The court's amended judgment grants Jensen Bros.

leave to enforce the trust deed note on the grounds that it
is in default.

This judgment is in error and Jensen Bros.

should be prevented from alleging that it did not agree to
accept land in exchange for equity in the Barrington House.
For " ... one may by his acts or conduct away from the court
prevent himself from denying in court the effect or result
of those acts."
598, 602 (1970).

Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P.2d
And the conduct of Jensen Bros. prior to the

trial indicates that it agreed to accept land in exchange for
equity.

Thus, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel,

Jensen Bros. is precluded from seeking to enforce the trust
deed note through a trustee's sale of the Barrington House.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is intended to prevent
injustice by protecting the individual from loss which he
could not escape if it were not for the estoppel.
Trust Co. v. State, 555 P.2d 594 (Okla. 1976).

Cleveland

"Estoppel

is a doctrine of equity purposed to rescue from loss a party
who has, without fault, been deluded into a course of action
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by the wrong or neglect of another."

Morgan v. Bd. of State

Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976).

In the present case,

Harward was lead to believe that Jensen Bros. had agreed to
accept a trade of land for equity in the Barrington House.
Consequently, he spent much time and effort in showing
various parcels of land to Jensen Bros.

Acting under this

belief, he also failed to pay any money on the trust deed note
of October 28, 1977.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel

must be applied in this case to prevent Harward from loss
due to conduct induced by Jensen Bros.
The elements of equitable estoppel were recently stated
by the Utah Court in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor
Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979).
The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of
estoppel are:
(1) an ~drnission, statement or act
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2)
action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement or act, and (3) injury to such other
party resulting from allowing the first party to con~
tradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act.
602 P.2d at 694.
In accord with Celebrity Club are Morgan v. Bd. of State
~----~----·-~--~

-

-

Lands, 549 P.2d 695, J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney, Inc.,
534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975), Carnesecca

Vo

Carnesecca, 572 P.2d

708 (Utah 1977), Irwin v. Pacific American Life Ins. Co., 10
Ariz. App. 196, 457 P.2d 736 (1969), Clawson v. Garrison, 3
Kan. App. 2d 188, 592 P.2d 117 (1979), Rel v. Douglas City
Civil Serv. Commission, 20 Wash. App. 764, 581 P.2d 1090 (1978),
City of Mercer Island v. Steinmann, 9 Wash. App. 479, 513
P.2d 80 (1973).
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In the instant case, the nature of Harward's injury has
already been established by the trial court; the trust deed
note, having been found in default, may be enforced through
a trustee's sale of the Harward's home.

Furthermore, Jensen

Bros. is granted leave to seek a deficiency judgment against
Harward for the amount not recovered in the tr~1stee's sale.
(Amended Judgment,

April 15, 1980, at 3-5.)

That Harward relied on the statements and acts of Jensen
Bros. is evident.

In the first place, he failed to pay any

money on the trust deed note.

Secondly, he expended much

effort and time in seeking parcels of ground suitable to
Jensen Bros.

He had no reason to do so other than to obtain

a parcel of land to exchange for the Jensen Bros.' equity.
in the Barrington House.
At the trial, Jensen Bros. rejected the assertion that
it had agreed to accept land in exchange for equity.
at 386.)

{Record

This claim is inconsistent with the actions prior

to the trial of the principals of Jensen Bros., however.
For representatives of Jensen Bros. indicated their willingness to accept land as a part of the bargain from the beginning.

(Record at 264, 387, 390-91.)

The disclosure/settle-

ment statement of December 9, 1977, for instance, provides
for a "Land Trade-in."

(Exhibit 36.)

On the faith of these

representations, Harward arranged to meet all the principals
of Jensen Bros. in early October 1977 in order to show them
several parcels of ground.

(Record at 265.)

On that day, he
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showed them at least three parcels of ground.
265-269.)

(Record at

And Harward then spent much time with Leon Jensen

looking at parcels of land from that October until the spring
of 1979.

(Record at 269-272, 288-89.)

was shown various parcels of land.

Marvin Jensen, too,

(Record at 297, 304.)

Yet there is no evidence to indicate that at any time while
they were being shown land representatives of Jensen Bros.
indicated to Harward that they would not accept such land in
exchange for equity in the Barrington House.

In fact, the

record indicates that representatives of Jensen Bros., through
express statements, leao Harward to just the opposite conclusion.
Leon Jensen and Harward discussed various parcels of
ground, the needs of Jensen Bros., and the kinds of projects
in which they intended to be involved until as late as March
1979.

(Record at 278.)

Furthermore, in March 1979 Harward

and Leon Jensen discussed an earlier conversation had between
Harward and Marvin Jensen regarding equity in the house.
Harward stated that he thought Jensen Bros. still intended
to buy ground.
opinion.

Leon Jensen responded that he was of that same

(Record at 305.)

And in June or July of 1978,

Marvin and Leon Jensen indicated that, while they had never
refused money for the property, they would be willing to take
ground.

Harward described the conversation:

I said, "Well, I thought you were going to take ground. "
They said, "Well, we've never refused to take money.
We take money and/or ground." And I said, "Well, it
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was my understanding you were to take ground."
(Record at 334, lines 10-13.)
A letter written by Leon Jensen to American Horne Mortgage, Inc. in November 1977 further indicates that Jensen
Bros. had agreed to accept land in exchange for their equity
in the house.

(Exhibit 37.)

In pertinent part, that letter

reads:
This letter will inform you as to the status of the
down payment
We have taken this downpayrnent as equity in land which
Mr. Harward owns on which we intend to begin development work and building in spring of 1978. We are
satisfied with this arrangement and feel it will
turn out profitable for us.
(Exhibit 37.)
Statements made at the trial by representatives of Jensen
Bros. further indicate the agreement of Jensen Bros. to accept
ground in exchange for equity.

Leon Jensen testified:

A

After May of 1978 was there a reason why you -- were
there reasons why you allowed him to show you property?

A

Yes.
It was obvious to us and he, I think, very,
well, I think it was very soon after the Note became due he told me that he just did not have the
funds to pay the Note off. And the reason why we
still considered property in exchange is to collect
somehow on the Note.
(Record at 393, lines 25-30;
to 394, line 1.)
(Emphasis added.)

Jensen Bros. could not still consider property unless it had
already intended to accept it. And the testimony here indicates that, while it was willing to take money on the trust
deed note, it had always agreed to accept ground, too.
Marvin Jensen's testimony also indicates the intention
by Jensen Bros. to accept land.
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Q

Did you not agree for Jensen Brothers by signing
Exhibit 38 to accept land for Jensen Brothers'
equity in the Barrington House?

A

Yes, we did.

(Record at 413, lines 12-15.)
Finally, in November 1978, Jensen Bros. entered into an
earnest money agreement on a parcel procured by Harward.
The actions and statements of Jensen Bros.' representatives
regarding the sale of that piece of property (the Williamson

25 acres) are further evidence that Jensen Bros. agreed to
accept land.

The circumstances surrounding this transaction

were described by Michael Memmott, who along with Peter Johnson,
held an option on the property.
A

Well, Leon Harward had come to us with -- had got
a hold of us indicating to us that he had some
clients who would be interested in buying some property which we had optioned. At that time they had
made offers to us on two different pieces that were
in close proximity of each other. They first
offered on some property 65 acres which we ultimately
didn't accept, and later offered on 25 acres with
which we had an option.

Q

Did this dealing have anything to do with Mr. Leon
Harward's purchase of what is known as Barrington
House?

A

Yes. That's right. The offer that was made to us
and accepted is that we accept the trust deed for
something like $45,000 as part of the settlement
that the -- or as part of the purchase price~ that
the Harwards would be paying us for the property.

(Record at 196, lines 4-18.)
The earnest money agreement in this sale was introduced
at the trial as Exhibit 38.

Shortly after the execution of

this instrument, Marvin Jensen sent a letter to Harward
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outlining the transaction.

(Exhibit 55.)

That letter

confirms the fact that Jensen Bros. had agreed to accept
land in trade for equity and reads in pertinent part:
According to our earnest money agreement for the south
25 acres from Williamsons, and per our several verbal
agreements, your note to us of $46,500.00 will be assumed
by Johnson and Memmott and become our equity down payment in the property.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

The arrangements to include your note in this
deal on Williamson's property should be of benefit to
both of us.
It is, as you know, because of these
negotiations that we have held off on our foreclosure
of your home.
(Exhibit 55.)
The application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel
is determined by an objective test, according to what a
reasonable person might have concluded under the circumstances.
Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 197/).

As

the court said in Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 417,
513 P.2d 417 (1973)

I

The determination of such an issue is not dependent
on the asserted subjective content of the mind of the
person claiming he was misled.
The test to be applied
is an objective one as to what a reasonable and prudent
person in the circumstances might conclude ... 513 P.2d
at 420.
A reasonably prudent person in Harward's situation would
have come to the same conclusion he did:

Jensen Bros. lead

him to believe that it would accept land in exchange for
equity by participating in the search for property.

Repre-

sentatives of Jensen Bros. were aware that he was committed
to finding property in exchange for the equity in the house.
Rather than telling him that they would not accept property,
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they traveled to various sites to view proposed property and
discussed the possibility of puchasing property for over a year.

A reasonable person would conclude that these actions were
motivated by an intent to accept the agreement to exchange land
for equity.

By its conduct and assertions, Jensen Bros. knowingly lead
Harward to seek land rather than pay money in exchange for equity in the property.

Harward's actions were reasonable and will

result in injury or detriment to him if Jensen Bros. is allowed
to repudiate or deny its conduct.

These facts have been esta-

blished by clear and convincing evidence.

Accordingly, Jensen

Bros. is equitably estopped from seeking a trustee's sale on
the trust deed note, and the judgment of the lower court is in
error and should be overturned.

VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REFORM THE TRUST
DEED NOTE BETWEEN HARWARD AND JENSEN BROS. TO

CO~FORM

TO THEIR AGREE:MENT TO TRADE LAND
WORTH $45,600 IN EXCHANGE FOR JENSEN BROS.' EQUITY
IN THE BARRINGTON HOUSE.
Harward seeks reformation of the trust deed note in this
case to reflect the terms of the agreement entered into between
himself and Jensen Bros.
Reformation is an equitable remedy.

Kesler v. Rogers,

542 P.2d 355 (Utah 1975).
The province of .refo:mation is t~ make a writing express the bargain which the parties desired to put in
writing. Reformation of a writing is justified when
the parties have come to a complete mutual understanding
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of all the essential terms of their bargain, but by reason
of mutual mistake, or its equivalent, tne written
.
agreement is not in conformity with such understanding
in a material matter.
Durkee v. Busk, 355 P.2d 588,
591 (Alaska 1960).
Before a contract can be reformed, then, there must have been
a prior meeting of the minds as to the terms of the writing.
Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P.2d 769 (Utah 1951).
The conditions which must be established in order to
reform a written contract were set out by the court in Jensen
v. Miller, 280 Or. 225, 570 P.2d 375 (1977).
The parties seeking reformation of a written contract
must establish, by the appropriate quantum of proof,
{l) that there was an antecedent agreement to which
the contract can be reformed~ (2) that there was a
mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake on the part of
the party seeking reformation arid inequitable conduct
on the part of the other party; and (3) that the party
seeking reformation was not guilty of gross negligence.
570 P.2d at 377.
Mutual mistake occurs when "both parties to a contract have
an identical intention as to the terms to be embodied in the
proposed contract, and the writing executed by them is rnaterially at variance with such intention."
214 P.2d 506

(Wash. 1950).

Keesling v. Pehling,

The fault sought to be corrected

by reformation is that the executed written instrument does
not reflect the true understanding of the parties. Voyta v.
Clonts, 328 P.2d 655 (Mont. 1958).
In the instant case, there is either mutual mistake in
reducing the agreement between Harward and Jensen Bros. to
writing, or unilateral mistake by Harward accompanied by
inequitable conduct on the part of Jensen Bros.

For as pre-

viously established, Jensen Bros. represented that it would
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take ground in exchange for its equity in the Barrington
House.

This was also the understanding of Harward.

However, the writing does not clearly establish this fact.
If the parties mutually agreed to this term, then the
writing was materially at variance with their intention.
And if Jensen Bros. secretly harbored an intention not to
perform according to this term of the contract, then it
is guilty of inequitable conduct in encouraging Harward
to proceed under the false apprehension that he need not
pay money, but could proceed to expend time and effort in
procuring land for Jensen Bros.

Harward cannot be said to

be guilty of gross negligence.

He was in continual communi-

cation with representatives of Jensen Bros. and remained
under the impression that they would accept land because
of their repeated representations and conduct.

He is,

therefore, entitled to reformation of the trust deed note
to reflect the terms of the agreement as entered into
with Jensen Bros.

The trial court erred when it failed to

reform the writing to reflect the original intent of the
parties.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
district court should be reversed or in the alternative
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'

a new trial should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,

R. William Bradford
Attorney for Appellant
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